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Abstract
One of the more notable features of Indonesian Islamic law is its
recognition of the concept ofjointly owned marital property. The Indonesian
doctrine of oint marital property bears a striking similarity to the community
property system in California. In both systems the marital estate consists of
property acquired during the marriage through the efforts of either of the
spouses. Both systems distinguish marital propertyfrom separate property and
both define separate property as all property owned by either spouse prior to
the marriage or acquired by gift or inheritance afterwards.
Apart from their doctrinal similarity, Indonesian Islamic marital property
and California community property are alike in another respect: Both are
transplanted elements existing in foreign legal environments. Indonesian
marital property is an indigenous Southeast Asian practice in an Islamic
conceptual structure, while community property is a continental civil law
institution in an Anglo-American common law system. In both cases,
moreover, the conception of marriage that underlies the doctrine of joint
marital property is out of harmony with the understanding of marriage
reflected in the system's treatment of marriage generally.
This Article compares the process of incorporation of joint marital
property in Indonesia and California. The results of this comparison
contradict the assumption that sacred legal systems are inherently less capable
of change and adaptation than secular systems. Focusing first on California, it
is shown that a fully egalitarian system of joint marital property did not
emerge until the 1970s, more than 100 years after the civil law doctrine of
community property was formally adopted in the state constitution in 1849. In
Indonesia, by contrast, the indigenous customary concept of marital property
encountered relatively little resistance from Islamic authorities. By
analogizing household economic production to a commercial partnership,
* Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.
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Islamicjurists were able to embrace joint marital property by recasting the
doctrine as an Islamic institution.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................................ 14 18
II. California Community Property .................................................. 1422
III. Harta Bersam a in Indonesia ........................................................ 1437
A. Adatrecht: Custom as Law .................................................. 1444
B. The Islamic Concept of Marital Property ............................. 1448
IV . C onclusion .................................................................................. 1459
I Introduction
One of the more notable features of Indonesian Islamic law is its
recognition of the concept ofjointly owned marital property. The development
of the doctrine of Islamic marital property dates from at least the eighteenth
century, and Indonesian Islamic tribunals have applied a doctrine of joint
marital property for more than 100 years.' The doctrine is currently spelled out
in both the National Marriage Law,2 which is applicable to Indonesians of all
religions, and in the Compilation of Islamic Law 3 (Compilation), a code of
family, inheritance, and charitable foundation rules that has been formally
designated as binding on the Islamic courts. The Compilation provides that
marital property, referred to with both the Indonesian term "harta bersama"
and the Arabic derived words "syirkah" or "syarikat," is all property that is
acquired during the marriage either by the husband and wife individually, or
through their joint efforts, regardless of who holds title to the property.4
1. DANIEL S. LEv, ISLAMIC COURTS IN INDONESIA: A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL BASIS OF
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 11 (1972).
2. Marriage Act, Law No. 1 (1974) (Indon.).
3. DEP'T OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, COMPILATION OF ISLAMIC LAW IN INDONESIA art. 1(f)
(1991) (Indon.) [hereinafter COMPILATION]; see Ahmad Imam Mawardi, The Political Backdrop
of the Enactment of the Compilation of Islamic Laws in Indonesia, in SHARI'A AND POLITICS IN
MODERN INDONESIA 125, 127 (Arskal Salim & Azyumardi Azra eds., 2003) (describing the
background and promulgation of the Compilation).
4. See Mawardi, supra note 3, at 127 (defining marital property under the Compilation,
which is binding on Islamic courts).
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The doctrine of joint marital property as applied by Indonesian Islamic
courts bears a striking similarity to community property laws that exist in
California, Texas, and a small number of other U.S. jurisdictions. 5 The basic
features of U.S. community property and Indonesian Islamic marital property
are identical. In both systems the marital estate consists of property acquired
during the marriage through the efforts of either of the spouses.6 Both systems
distinguish marital property from separate property belonging to the individual
husband or wife, and both define separate property in the same way: Separate
property consists of property owned by either spouse prior to the marriage or
acquired during the marriage by either gift or inheritance.7
The similarity between harta bersama and community property is entirely
fortuitous. Property rights within marriage are not treated in standard works of
Islamic jurisprudence, and the doctrine ofjoint marital property is not known in
Islamic law outside of Southeast Asia.8 The Indonesian Islamic doctrine of
joint marital property is derived from Southeast Asian custom or adat and was
absorbed into Islam by analogy to Islamic principles of business partnership.
9
The doctrine of community property as practiced in the United States has its
source in continental European civil law. 10 Louisiana, which follows the
French civil law tradition, applied a community property doctrine from the
5. See Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal
Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REv. 20, 20-21 (1967) (discussing the states that follow the
community property doctrine in the United States). The eight community property jurisdictions
are Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, California, Idaho, and Washington. Id.
The Texas constitution, approved in 1840, adopts community property even though Texas law is
otherwise based on common law. Id. New Mexico operated under the community property
laws of Spain until 1901 when it was codified in statute. Id. Arizona adopted community
property by statute in 1865 shortly after separating from New Mexico. Id. California
recognized community property in its constitution of 1849. Id. at 21. Nevada, Idaho, and
Washington adopted community property in statutes passed in 1861, 1867, and 1869
respectively. Id.
6. See C. VAN VOLLENHOVEN, VAN VOLLENHOVEN ON INDONESIAN ADAT LAW:
SELECTIONS FROM HET ADATRECHT VAN NEDERLANDSCH INDIE LVIII 86-88 (J.F. Holleman ed.
& trans., 1981) (explaining how marital property functions in Indonesia); see also J. Emmett
Sebree, Outlines of Community Property, 6 N.Y.U. L. REv. 32, 42-44 (1932) (discussing
marital property ownership in community property jurisdictions).
7. See VAN VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 6, at 86-88 (describing how marital property
functions in Indonesia).
8. See JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO IsLAMIc LAW 161-68 (Oxford Univ. Press
1984) (1964) (noting the general principles of Islamic marriage law where no mention is made
of marital property).
9. See VAN VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 6, at 86-88 (explaining how marital property
works under adat law).
10. See Vaughn, supra note 5, at 20 (discussing the legal roots of community property
statutes).
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eighteenth century and preserved it in the civil code it adopted in 1808.11 The
other community propertyjurisdictions are all in the western United States, and
they trace their marital property systems back to Spain.
12
Apart from their doctrinal similarity, Indonesian Islamic marital property
and California community property are alike in another respect: Both are
transplanted elements existing in foreign legal environments. 13 Harta bersama
is an indigenous Southeast Asian practice in an Islamic conceptual structure,
while community property is a continental civil law institution in an Anglo-
American common law system. 14 In both cases, moreover, the conception of
marriage that underlies the doctrine ofjoint marital property is out of harmony
with the understanding of marriage reflected in other aspects of the legal
systems that have incorporated the doctrine.' 5 The recognition ofjoint marital
property in both Indonesia and the United States is commonly associated with
an understanding of marriage as a partnership between the spouses. 16 That
understanding clashes with the vision of marriage embodied in both standard
Islamic doctrine and the common law. 17 Marriage within Islamic law is
conceived as a contract in which the rights and obligations of the respective
spouses are clearly spelled out.18 The husband undertakes to provide his wife
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Orrin K. McMurray, The Beginnings of the Community Property System in
California and theAdoption of the Common Law, 3 CAL. L. REv. 359,369-73 (1915) (outlining
the debate over adopting the civil or common law during the California constitutional
convention of 1851); see also VAN VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 6, at 81-82 (describing the
interplay between Islamic and adat law).
14. See VAN VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 6, at 86-88 (explaining how Indonesian
community property law functions); see also Susan Westerberg Prager, The Persistence of
Separate Property Concepts in California's Community Property System, 1849-1975, 24
UCLA L. REv. 1, 25 (1976) (discussing the adoption of community property in California).
15. See VAN VOLLENnOVEN, supra note 6, at 81-82 (discussing how only the husband can
effect a divorce, but both spouses receive property in Indonesia); see also Prager, supra note 14,
at 20 (noting the view of many California constitutional convention delegates that the common
law perception of marriage was "unfair").
16. See VAN VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 6, at 81-82 (mentioning that neither party can
compel the other to perform marital duties, including conjugal intercourse and domestic chores);
see also J. Emmett Sebree, Outlines of Community Property, 6 N.Y.U. L. REv. 32, 32-33 (1932)
(discussing the evolution of community property as a revolt against the despotism of the
husband and the creation of a contract).
17. Compare SCHACHT, supra note 8, at 161-68 (discussing the general principles of
Islamic marriage law), with HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 103-15
(2000) (outlining the traditional common law view of marriage).
18. ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI, MARRIAGE ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF FAMILY LAW, IRAN AND
MOROCCO COMPARED 34-35 (1993).
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with support, in return for which the wife is obliged to grant her husband sexual
access.' 9 But, while marriage in Islamic law is conceptualized in terms of
contract, the parties do not contract as equals. 20 The wife is party to the
completed contract, but she does not participate directly in its creation. 21 The
offer and acceptance that brings the marriage into existence is carried out by the
prospective husband and the legal guardian of the bride, typically her father.22
The Islamic conception of marriage is also reflected in the rules that govern its
termination, which grant husbands far greater powers to divorce than are
possessed by wives.23
The common law image of marriage is one of union.24 Marriage is not a
contract but a bond.25 This view was embodied in the concept of coverture.
William Blackstone famously defined coverture:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or
at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under
whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing and her
condition, during her marriage, is called her coverture.
26
The arithmetic of marital unity had a number of concrete legal
consequences. The law of evidence did not allow wives to testify for or against
their husbands, since the former would violate the rule disallowing the
testimony of interested witnesses, and the latter runs afoul of the privilege
19. Id. at 36.
20. See id. at 32 (noting the importance of the role played by the guardian of the woman
in negotiating marriage contracts).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See AHMAD IBN NAQIB AL-MISRI, RELIANCE OF THE TRAVELLER: A CLASSIC MANUAL OF
SACRED LAW 556 (Nuh H. Mim Keller trans., 1994) (mentioning the methods given to males to
terminate a marriage while giving no comparable abilities to females). Standard interpretations
of Islamic law grant husbands an absolute right to terminate their marriage at any time by simply
pronouncing their repudiation or "taldq." Id. As stated in one text, "Divorce is valid from any
husband who is sane, has reached puberty, and who voluntarily effects it." Id.
24. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 42 (1982) ("In the eyes of the law the husband and wife were
one person-the husband."); see also HARTOG, supra note 17, at 103-15 (discussing how some
men attempted to use the concept of marital unity to legitimatize beating their wives since
beating oneself was not a crime).
25. See HARTOG, supra note 17, at 106-07 (discussing the abolition of the wife's separate
legal existence in marriage).
26. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 441-42; see also
BASCH, supra note 24, at 43-46 (discussing the influence of Blackstone's Commentaries on the
thinking of both lawyers and lay people in eighteenth and nineteenth century America).
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against compelled self-incrimination. 2' A married woman was considered to
share her husband's domicile regardless of where she actually lived.28 Marital
unity explained why women could not vote, because that would involve the
casting of two votes by a single person, 29 and the arcane rule prohibiting a
widower from marrying his dead wife's sister, which would be incest.30 This
merging of the wife's legal personality into that of her husband made the
husband the owner of his wife's property.3'
This Article examines the assimilation of community property and harta
bersama into the legal systems of California and Indonesia. Part II focuses on
California. That Part recounts the process by which the state's constitution
inscribed the doctrine of community property but then immediately subverted it
by implementing legislation passed the following year.32 For the next century
and a quarter, marital property rights in California were little different from
other American states, notwithstanding California's distinction as one of the
small number of states categorized as community property jurisdictions. 33 Part
III examines the "Islamization" of customary marital property doctrines in
Indonesia. Surprisingly, perhaps, Indonesian Islamic authorities embraced a
version ofj oint marital property that grants equal rights to husbands and wives,
notwithstanding Islam's general bias in favor of men.34 In a brief conclusion, I
call attention to the unexpected flexibility of Islamic law as against the secular
legal system of California.
I. California Community Property
In February of 1848, the United States and Mexico signed the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo ending the Mexican American War.35 In the Treaty,
Mexico ceded to the United States all Mexican territory north of the Rio
27. HARTOG, supra note 17, at 105-06.
28. Id. at 106.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. BASCH, supra note 24, at 51.
32. Prager, supra note 14, at 25-28.
33. See id. at 2 (discussing the historical dominance of separate property concepts during
much of California's history).
34. See VAN VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 6, at 81-82 (discussing how both spouses receive
property in Indonesia upon dissolution of a marriage).
35. RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: A LEGACY
OF CONFLICT 42 (1990).
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Grande, including the region that now comprises the state of California.36
Unbeknownst to the officials who signed the treaty, gold had been discovered
at a mill in the Sierra Nevada Mountains of northern California just days
earlier. 37 News of the discovery was reported in eastern U.S. newspapers in
August of 1848, and President Polk announced the discovery in a message to
Congress in December.38 Approximately 75,000 gold seekers arrived in
California in 1849, 3 9 and many tens of thousands more entered in the state in
the years that followed.4 °
It was in the context of this extraordinary social transformation that the
military governor of California called a constitutional convention in the fall of
1849 to draft a constitution.4' The issue of property rights within marriage
assumed particular importance at the convention.42 There were two reasons for
this. The first reason had to do with the makeup of California society.
Europeans of Spanish descent had lived in California for more than 200 years.43
The marital property law of these "Californios" was based on the ganancial
system of Spanish law.44 Concerned about the impact of massive immigration
on their way of life, the Spanish speaking population saw preservation of
existing property doctrines as a bulwark against the forces of change.45 The
more recent immigrants to the region were primarily from the eastern United
States, 46 where rights over property within marriage were governed by the
36. KEVIN STARR, CALIFORNIA 73 (2005).
37. Id. at 77-79. On January 24, 1848, James Wilson Marshall, a carpenter hired to
construct a sawmill in New Hevetia, discovered gold. Id. The treaty that ceded California to the
United States was signed on February 2, 1848. DEL CASTILLO, supra note 35, at 43.
38. STARR, supra note 36, at 80 (describing the beginning of the 1849 California gold
rush).
39. Orrin K. McMurray, The Beginnings of the Community Property System in California
and the Adoption of the Common Law, 3 CAL. L. REV. 359, 359-60 (1915).
40. STARR, supra note 36, at 80 (mentioning the population boom in California following
the 1848 gold rush).
41. Id. at 91 (discussing the history and the rationales behind the calling of the California
constitutional convention).
42. Prager, supra note 14, at 8-24 (discussing the importance of property rights during
the proceedings of the California constitutional convention).
43. See STARR, supra note 36, at 20-42 (describing Spain's gradual exploration and
colonization of modern-day California).
44. RICHARD BALLINGER, A TREATISE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE,
UNDER THE COMMUNITY OR GANANCIAL SYSTEM § 9 (1895) (outlining the historical origins of
the California legal system pre-1849).
45. Prager, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing the importance of property rights in order to
maintain wealth for "Californio" delegates at the California constitutional convention).
46. See McMurray, supra note 39, at 359-60 (noting that 76,000 of the estimated 80,000
migrants to California in 1849 were Americans).
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common law.47 Some of the "Anglo" delegates to the constitutional convention
strongly favored adoption of common law marital property doctrine for
California.48
A second factor contributing to the importance attached to the issue of
marital property law at the convention was the attention being given to the
subject in the United States generally. By the time the California constitutional
convention met in 1849, the common law system of marital property "was in
widespread disrepute as an oppressive and 'feudal' system. ' 49 The property
law system advocated by early nineteenth century reformers was in several
respects similar to the civil law of marital property that found its way to the
American southwest by way of Spain. 50  By the time the California
constitutional convention met in 1849 a number of eastern states had passed
reforms improving the legal rights of women within marriage. 51 The debate
over marital property law in California occurred against the background of this
larger reform effort.
52
The choice faced by delegates to the convention was between the common
law marital property system that applied in most of the states and the civil law
system that had been followed in California while still a part of Mexico.
53
Judging by the record of the debate over marital property, the Anglo delegates
may not have fully understood the extent of the difference between the two
systems or the full implications of their decision. 54 The difference, however, is
substantial.55 Under the common law doctrine of coverture, a woman
relinquished virtually all her rights to property upon marriage, 56 and under the
doctrine of marital services the husband acquired the right to his wife's labor.57
47. See Prager, supra note 14, at 11 (mentioning the original homes of delegates to the
California constitutional convention).
48. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
49. HARTOG, supra note 17, at 14.
50. See Prager, supra note 14, at 24 (mentioning that many delegates to the California
constitutional convention did not see major differences between community property and the
proposed married woman's property acts put forth by reformers).
51. BASCH, supra note 24, at 27-28.
52. Prager, supra note 14, at 21.
53. Id. at 24.
54. See id. at 21-24 (summarizing the positions taken by delegates on marital property at
the California constitutional convention).
55. See id. at 3-4, 6-7 (summarizing common law and community property systems).
56. Anne Lombard, Coverture, in WOMEN IN AMERICAN HISTORY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
57. John D. Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School
Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1046 (1972).
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In return for the protection and support he provided for his wife, the husband
became the owner of all personal property belonging to his wife prior to the
marriage and his wife's services during the marriage.58 A married woman
retained title to her real property, but possession and control of the property was
the right of her husband.5 9
Some of the Anglo delegates strongly supported adoption of the common
law.60 The record of the debates includes a speech by a delegate identified as
Mr. Botts extolling the virtues of common law marital property doctrine as
reflecting both natural and divine truth. Botts's peroration both sets forth the
premises of the doctrine and captures the romantic excesses of its nineteenth
century defenders. In speaking in opposition to the adoption of language from
the Texas constitution that endorsed community property, Botts stated:
In my opinion, there is no provision so beautiful in the common law, so
admirable and beneficial, as that which regulates this sacred contract
between man and wife. Sir, the God of nature made woman frail, lovely,
and dependent; and such the common law pronounces her. Nature did what
the common law has done-put her under the protection of man; and it is
the object of this clause to withdraw her from that protection, and put her
under the protection of the law. I say, sir, the husband will take better care
of the wife, provide for her better and protect her better, than the law. He
who would not let the winds of heaven too rudely touch her, is her best
protector. When she trusts him with her happiness, she may trust him with
her gold. You lose the substance in the shadow; by this provision you risk
her happiness forever, whilst you protect her property. This proposition, I
believe, is calculated to produce dissension and strife in families. The only
despotism on earth that I would advocate is the despotism of the husband.
There must be a head and there must be a master of every household; and I
believe this plan by which you propose to make the wife independent of the
husband, is contrary to the laws and provisions of nature-contrary to all
the wisdom which we have derived from experience.6'
The conception of marriage reflected in Botts's statement derives from the
common law, but the common law doctrine was revised and put to new uses in
revolutionary America.62 As Professor Nancy Cott has shown, the weight
attached to ideas about marriage and the family in the Anglo-American
tradition is related to the connection made between domestic life and the body
58. Id. at 1045.
59. Id.
60. Prager, supra note 14, at 18-20.
61. J. Ross BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE
FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 259-60 (1850).
62. NANCY F. CoTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THENATION 10(2000).
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politic in English political theory.63 In sixteenth and seventeenth century
England, the authority exercised by the father and husband within the home
was understood as directly analogous to the authority exercised by the king over
his people.64 Just as the monarch ruled by divine right, the father's authority
within the home was God-given.65
The principle of divinely ordained rule was not, of course, conducive to
the interests of revolutionaries in America who wished to deny the authority of
the English king.66 Colonial Americans did not abandon the family metaphor
but adapted it to meet current needs.67 Drawing on the legacy of the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, American revolutionaries of the late seventeenth century
sought to establish consent as the basis for legitimate political authority.68 This
new understanding of the foundations of governance did not sever the
conceptual connection between legitimate political domination and relations
within the family.69 Rather, the contract logic of political thought was carried
over into thinking about the family.70 The image of marriage as patriarchal
hierarchy was replaced by an ideal of conjugal union grounded in consent.71
While marriage as a "loving partnership" connotes a less hierarchical
relationship, the adoption of new theoretical foundations for marriage did not
fundamentally alter understandings of the proper relations between husbands
and wives. 72 In explaining the relations within marriage, the analogy to the
government and the governed was particularly useful. "By consenting, citizens
delegated authority to their elected representatives, and the wife gave authority
63. Id.
64. The analogy is clearly evident in a passage from Shakespeare's The Taming of the
Shrew quoted by Professor Cott:
Such duty as the subject owes the prince
Even such a woman oweth her husband,
And when she is forward, peevish, sullen, sour
And not obedient to his honest will,
What is she but a foul contending rebel
And graceless traitor to her loving lord?
Id. at 12 (quoting SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS 363 (G.B. Harrison ed., 1948)).
65. Id. at 13.
66. Id. at 14-15.
67. Id. at 14-23.
68. Id. at 14-15.
69. Id. at 16-17.
70. Id. at 14-15.
71. Id. at 16-17.
72. Id. at 17.
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to her husband. In both instances governance based on consent was no less
governance.,
73
As mentioned above, the premises of the common law's treatment of
women's property rights within marriage had come under attack from the
1830s, and by the time the California constitutional convention met in 1849, a
number of states had enacted changes to the strict common law system.74 These
statutes, known as Married Women's Property Acts, granted married women
the right to own property.75 The delegates were probably aware of these laws
and the controversy over the rights of married women to own property under
the common law, and several of the Anglo delegates spoke in favor of the
76principle of separate property. Notably, however, the debate nowhere reflects
an understanding of the concept ofjointly owned or common property,77 which
is the hallmark of the community property system.
The concept of community property that eventually found its way to
California is commonly traced to the customary practices of Germanic peoples
that were then absorbed into continental civil law.78 A late nineteenth century
text on the ganancial system of Spanish law described the concept of
community property as follows:
73. Id.
74. BASCH, supra note 24, at 39. The first such statute was passed by the state of
Mississippi in 1839. Id. By the time the California constitutional convention met in 1849,
married women's property acts had also been passed in Michigan (1844), Maine (1844), and
Massachusetts (1845). Id.
75. The New York statute, passed in 1860, provided:
The property, both real and personal, which any married woman now owns, as her
sole and separate property; that which comes to her by descent, devise, bequest, gift
or grant; that which she acquires by her trade, business, labor or services, carried on
or performed on her sole or separate account; that which a woman married in this
state owns at the time of her marriage, and the rents, issues and proceeds of all such
property, shall, notwithstanding her marriage, be and remain her sole and separate
property, and may be used, collected and invested by her in her own name, and
shall not be subject to the interference or control of her husband, or liable for his
debts, except such debts as may have been contracted for the support of herself or
her children, by her as his agent.
1860 N.Y. Sess. Laws 157 (McKinney).
76. Prager, supra note 14, at 20-21.
77. Id. at 22.
78. Sebree, supra note 6, at 32-33. The concept ofjointly owned marital property grew
out of a conception of marriage as essentially an economic partnership. Id. at 33-34. As
described by Sebree, "The causes which made the wife the partner to the husband are of an
economic, rather than a moral nature. It grew out of the natural impulse toward a suitable
provision for the wife's support and a reaction against the husband's despotic power." Id.
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The principle which lies at the foundation of the whole system is, that
whatever is acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and wife, shall be
their common property; the theory of the law being, that the marriage, in
respect to property acquired during its existence, is a community of which
each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry to its
prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after its
dissolution, in case one survive the other.
79
The direct lineage of California community property runs through Spanish
law. 80 But as Professor Reva Siegel has shown in a study of the mid-nineteenth
century movement for the reform of U.S. marital property law, women's rights
activists developed arguments for a system ofjointly owned property similar to
the community property system based on a critique of contemporary common
law doctrines.8' While these arguments did not result in the adoption of a
system ofjoint property anywhere in the United States, the demands made by
joint property activists provide part of the background to the development of a
system of community property in California. 2 On at least one occasion the
arguments of the reformers were presented to the California legislature
directly.
83
The nineteenth century movement for recognition ofjoint marital property
was grounded in a rejection of the basic assumptions of the common law
matrimonial property system. 84 Under the common law doctrine of marital
services, the contribution of the wife to the functioning of the household
belonged to the husband by virtue of the support he gave to his wife. 5 The
Married Women's Property Acts granted wives the right to own property but
left the doctrine of marital services intact8 6 While wives acquired the right to
own property derived from work outside the home, the husband retained the
right to his wife's services in the home. The essence of the argument forjoint
79. BALLINGER, supra note 44, at 11.
80. Patricia Seed, American Law, Hispanic Traces: Some Contemporary Entanglements
of Community Property, 52 WM. & MARY Q. 157, 157 (1995).
81. Reva Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives'
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-83 (1994).
82. Prager, supra note 14, at 21.
83. Siegel, supra note 81, at 1170. In 1872 a special committee of the California
legislature used arguments based on the economic value of the wife's contribution to the
household in recommending giving wives a right of survivorship in community property equal
to that of her husband. Id. The proposal was never enacted, however. Id.
84. HARTOG, supra note 17, at 110-15.
85. Johnston, supra note 57, at 1045.
86. Siegel, supra note 81, at 1076.
87. Id.
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property consisted of two contentions: First the household labor typically
performed by women has economic value; and, second women are the owners
of their labor.88 The implication the reformers drew from these two
propositions was that wives should be entitled to a share of the household
wealth.89 A statement by Frances Gage in 1855 that is quoted by Professor
Siegel forcefully expresses the basic argument.90 Gage's statement was made
in response to a letter written to Elizabeth Cady Stanton by Gerrit Smith, an
abolitionist and sympathizer with the women's rights movement. 9' The
comment by Smith that prompted Gage's response clearly reflects the common
assumption that wives do not engage in productive labor: 92 "[T]o concede to
her the rights of property would be to benefit her comparatively little unless she
shall resolve to break out of her clothes-prison and to undertake right earnestly,
as right earnestly as a man, to get property."93 Gage replied:
But do not women now work right earnestly? Do not German women and
our market women labor right earnestly? Do not the wives of our farmers
and our mechanics toil? Is not the work of mothers in our land as important
as that of the father? "Labor is the foundation of wealth." The reason that
our women are "paupers," is not that they do not labor "right earnestly," but
that the law gives their earnings into the hands of manhood. Mr. Smith
says, "That women are helpless, is no wonder, so long as they are paupers";
he might add, no wonder that the slaves of the cotton plantation are
helpless, so long as they are paupers. What reduces both the woman and
the slave to this condition? The law which gives the husband and the
master entire control of the person and the earnings of each; the law that
robs each of the rights and liberties that every "free white male citizen"
takes to himself as God-given.... Let us assert our right to be free. Let us
get out of our prison-house of law. Let us own ourselves, our earnings, our
genius; let us have power to control as well as to earn and to own; then will
each woman adjust her dress to her relations in life.94
There is no evidence that the delegates to the California constitutional
convention were familiar with the advocacy for joint marital property.95 The
early efforts of the reformers focused on eastern states that followed the
88. Id.
89. Id.




94. Id. at 1102.
95. See Prager, supra note 14, at 20 (mentioning the primary motivation for community
property to be the wish for a "progressive constitution").
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common law.96 The majority of the delegates to the constitutional convention
were Anglos,97 who presumably could have overridden the Californians and
adopted the common law had they so desired. One of the reasons they chose
not to was because of a desire to enlist the support of the Californians so as to
present a better case for admission to the union as a state.98 Comments by
Anglo delegates during the debate indicate that some of them favored granting
property rights to married women, and adoption of community property was
apparently perceived as one means to accomplish that goal.99 But community
property was not even mentioned during the debates,'00 and the delegates may
have understood the question before the convention to be simply whether wives
should be entitled to separate property. The language that was adopted in the
constitution was taken from the Texas constitution.' While the text makes
reference to common property, the principal focus of the language is on
separate property. °2 Article XI, Section 14 of the California Constitution of
1849 states:
96. Siegel, supra note 81, at 1169-70. In the period after the Civil War the campaign for
joint property developed a strong presence in the northwest. Id. One of the leading proponents
of the principle that wives were entitled to a share of the wealth generated through a marriage in
the 1870s was Marietta Stow, a California woman. Id. Stow, who was delivered from wealth
into poverty when her husband died, focused her efforts on inheritance reform. Id. An
inheritance law bill presented to the California legislature in 1872 took the reformers arguments
about the legal expropriation of women's labor as its explicit point of departure. Id. at 1170. In
its report on a bill to give wives a right of survivorship in community property, a special
committee of the legislature wrote:
Being familiar with business, the husband assumes the control of out-of-door
matters; the wife, educated to indoor labors, takes charge of the house, the home,
and family. While the husband may prosper in business and accumulate wealth, the
wife may at the same time perform equally well her duties in a more narrow, but not
less important, sphere.... Unless money is more valuable than the mind of man,
and coin than character, the business qualifications of the husband may be fairly
and equally offset by the home duties of the wife.... If either partner of the
matrimonial firm fails to perform a full share of the labor assumed or assigned that
is misfortune, but it should not be allowed to vitiate the personal property rights of
either spouse.
Id.
97. McMurray, supra note 39, at 373.
98. Prager, supra note 14, at 16.
99. Id. at 16-17.
100. Id. at 22.
101. See id. at 8 n.39, 21 n. 109 ("The California and Texas provisions were identical.").
For the language of the Texas provision, see TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. VII, § 19.
102. See Prager, supra note 14, at 21-24 (discussing the emphasis on separate property in
the debates and the adopted language of the California constitution).
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All property, both real and personal, of the wife, owned or claimed by
marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, shall be
her separate property; and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the
rights of the wife, in relation as well to her separate property, as to that held
in common with her husband. Laws shall also be passed providing for the
registration of the wife's separate property.
10 3
In 1850, the first California legislature passed implementing legislation for
Article XI, Section 14. 04 If there was any uncertainty about the type of marital
property system adopted by this provision beforehand, that uncertainty was put
to rest by the legislation. The legislation defined separate and community
property in accordance with standard Spanish doctrine. 10 5 Separate property
was defined as "property owned before the marriage or acquired.., by gift or
inheritance" after the marriage. 1 06 "Common" or "community"10 7 property was
defined as "property acquired... by either husband or wife" during the
marriage.
°8
The implementing statute confirmed that the constitution adopted the
Spanish law of community property. 109 However, other parts of the statute
seemed to be inspired by common law attitudes. While the statute recognized
the wife's ownership of separate property, it vested management and control
over the wife's property in the husband.' ° The limitations on the husband's
power over his wife's property were very narrow. The law required that the
wife consent to any transfer or encumbrance of her property.' The statute also
provided for the appointment of a trustee upon a showing by the wife that her
103. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. XI, § 14.
104. See Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, 1849-1850 Cal. Stat. 254, 254-55 (defining the
property rights of the husband and the wife).
105. See Prager, supra note 14, at 25-26 (discussing the features of Spanish civil law that
were incorporated into the California marital property system).
106. Id. at 25; see also Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 1 (defining the separate property
of the husband and the wife).
107. Prager, supra note 14, at 25 n. 125 (explaining that the terms "common property" and
"community property" are used interchangeably).
108. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 2.
109. See Prager, supra note 14, at 25-26 ("[T]he 1850 statute reinforces the view that the
convention's action was an attempt to assure the continued life of the Spanish marital
community of property.").
110. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 6, 1849-1850 Cal. Stat., 254, 254.
111. See id. ("[N]o sale or alienation of any part of [the wife's separate] property can be
made, nor any lien or incumbrance [sic] created thereon, unless by an instrument in writing,
signed by the husband and wife. . . ."); see also Prager, supra note 14, at 26 (discussing the
consent requirement).
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property was being wasted or mismanaged by her husband. 1 2 Even in those
circumstances, however, the managerial authority was not given to the wife, but
her private property was placed under the control of a trustee. 113
In addition to powers over the wife's separate property, the 1850 law also
gave the husband management authority over the community property." 4 Here
the husband's power was complete. The consent of the wife was not required
for any transaction involving community property and there was no provision
for depriving the husband of his management powers if he abused them.1 5 The
statute stated, "The husband shall have the entire management and control of
the common property, with the like absolute power of disposition as to his own
separate estate." 16
Community property was enshrined in California's fundamental law, but
for decades after the adoption of the constitution, the property rights of married
women in California differed very little from the rights of women under the
common law." 7 During the marriage the husband's rights with respect to
community property were, for practical purposes, indistinguishable from full
ownership." 8 In a decision construing the 1850 statute ten years after its
enactment, the interest of the wife was described as "a mere expectancy, like
the interest which an heir may possess in the property of his ancestor." '19 This
expectancy ripened into rights of ownership only if the wife "survived the
112. See Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 8 ("If the wife has just cause to apprehend that
her husband has mismanaged or wasted, or will mismanage or waste, her separate property,
she... may apply.., for the appointment of a trustee, to take charge of and manage her
separate estate .... ); Prager, supra note 14, at 26 (discussing the ability of the wife to transfer
control of her separate property to a trustee).
113. See Prager, supra note 14, at 26 ("It is note-worthy that the remedy for
mismanagement or waste was not a transfer of power to the wife, who, after all, owned the
property.").
114. See Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 9 (establishing the husband's control over
community property); Prager, supra note 14, at 26-27 (discussing the management of the
community property).
115. See Prager, supra note 14, at 27 (noting the "unchecked" power of the husband over
community property).
116. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 9, 1849-1850 Cal. Stat. 254, 254.
117. See Prager, supra note 14, at 28 (observing that the structure of the California
community property system did not provide married women with "property rights substantially
greater than those embodied in the common law").
118. See Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 9 (providing the husband with "absolute power"
over community property); Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860) (stating that the title
to common property "rests in the husband").
119. Van Maren, 15 Cal. at 311.
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termination of the marriage."' 120 If the marriage ended as a result of the death of
the wife the expectancy was never realized.'12
Professor Prager divided the subsequent developments in California
marital property law into three phases. 122  During the latter half of the
nineteenth century the husband's control over community property was further
consolidated, while the rights of the wife with respect to her separate property
were gradually expanded. 123 Under the 1850 legislation wives had no rights
over any part of the community property unless the marriage ended in divorce
or in the death of the husband. 24 A statute passed in 1861 stripped wives of
the power to dispose of their share of the community property by will. 25 If the
marriage ended with the death of the wife, the entire community property
passed to the husband. 126 Husbands, however, had full testamentary authority
over their share of the community property.127
Under the "mere expectancy" theory of community property, wives were
made heirs to a share of common property. 28  To compensate for their
120. Prager, supra note 14, at 35; see also Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, §§ 11-12
(providing the wife with half of the common property upon divorce and half of the common
property upon the death of the husband unless he has no descendants, in which case the wife
gets all of the common property).
121. See Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 11 (establishing that, upon the death of the wife,
half of the common property is given to her descendants, but if none exists the entire estate
remains with the husband).
122. See Prager, supra note 14, at 2 (identifying the phases of development as: the
expansion of separate property rights prior to 1890, the growth of community property
principles between 1891 and 1927, and the reformation of the marital property system during
the 1970s).
123. See id. at 34-47 (reviewing the balance created between the husband's control of
common property and the wife's control of her separate property).
124. See Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, §§ 9, 11-12, 1849-1850 Cal. Stat. 254, 254-55
(establishing that common property was controlled by the husband during marriage and divided
equally between the husband and wife when the marriage dissolved); Prager, supra note 14, at
35-36 (describing the wife's interest in community property as a "mere expectancy," which was
realized when the marriage ended).
125. SeeActofMay8, 1861, ch. 323, § 1, 1861 Cal. Stat. 310-11 (amending Section 11 of
the 1850 statute to give the husband sole rights to the entire community estate when the wife
dies); Prager, supra note 14, at 37 ("[T]he law gave the wife no testamentary power over the
community, making her husband her only potential heir with respect to that property.")
126. See Act of May 8, 1861, ch. 323, § 1 ("[U]pon the dissolution of the community by
the death of the wife, the entire common property shall go to the surviving husband."); Prager,
supra note 14, at 37-38 ("The husband was certain to lose none of the community property by
his wife's death.").
127. See Act of May 8, 1861, ch. 323, § 1 ("In case of the death of the husband, if there be
no descendants of the husband, one-half of the common property may be subject to his
testamentary disposition . ").
128. See Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860) (establishing the "mere
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complete lack of any rights over community assets, the California legislature
expanded the rights of wives over their own separate property.129 The effect of
these changes was to mirror the law in common law jurisdictions that had
passed a married women's property act.130 The wife gained full control of all
the property she owned prior to the marriage or that she acquired by gift or
inheritance after marriage. 131 A wife also owned her earnings, but the earnings
of the husband were, for practical purposes, his alone. 1
32
The second phase of development dated from 1891 to 1927.133 During
this period the rights of wives with respect to community property gradually
expanded. 134 The first step in this direction was the enactment in 1891 of a law
"requiring the written consent of the wife before any gift of community
property could be made."' 135 This was followed in 1901 and 1917 by statutes
limiting the husband's power to sell or convey home furnishings and the
family's "wearing apparel" and requiring the participation of the wife in
transactions involving community real property. 36 In 1923, for the first time,
wives were given testamentary power over their share of the community
property. 37  Finally, a statute passed in 1927 provided that the respective
interests of husband and wife in community property during the continuance of
the marriage relation "are 'present, existing and equal' interests [under] the
management and control of the husband." 1
38
expectancy" theory).
129. See Prager, supra note 14, at 39 (explaining the increased rights of the wife over her
separate property as a legislative attempt to balance the husband's extensive control over the
community property).
130. See id. at 46-47 (noting the similarities between the California system and the
separate property systems created by married women's property acts).
131. See id. at 39-40 ("[I]t was not until the adoption of the civil code in 1872 that full
managerial power over the wife's separate property was established in the wife .... " (citing 1
CODES AND STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA § 5162, at 595 (T. Hittel ed., 1876))).
132. See id. at 45-46 (noting that because of an 1870 statute, "the wife's earnings
constituted a special class of community property which was treated as her separate property").
133. See id. at 47 (describing the period from 1891 to 1927 as a legislative shift from "the
expansion of married women's separate property rights" to the modification of community
property principles).
134. See id. at 47-63 (discussing the reforms that reduced the husband's ability to manage
community property and altered his "status as exclusive owner").
135. Id. at 49.
136. See id. at 52-55 (discussing the two pieces of legislation and the judicial
interpretation of the laws).
137. See id. at 56 (recognizing that the 1923 legislation gave wives the testamentary power
enjoyed by husbands since 1861).
138. Id. at 63 (quoting the 1927 California Legislature).
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The growing legal recognition of the authority of married women to own
and manage property coincided with the erosion and eventual rejection of the
legal doctrine of coverture and the emergence of a new ideal for marriage.1
39
Symbolically at least, the final step in this process was achieved with the
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. 140 As Professor Cott has written, "The
marital model in which the individuality and citizenship of the wife disappeared
into her husband's legal persona had to go, logically, once women gained the
vote in 1920."'
141
Female suffrage and the repudiation of coverture signaled a turning point
in the conceptualization of marriage in American society. The family ideology
based on principles of authority and governance developed at a time when the
technologies of modern governance were still relatively undeveloped. 142 In this
situation, "[m]onogamous marriages that distinguished citizen-heads of
households had enormous instrumental value for governance, because orderly
families, able to accumulate and transmit private property and to sustain an
American people, descended from them."'143 With the recognition of the
independent legal personality of married women, marriage was no longer
understood in terms drawn from the vocabulary of politics. 144
As Professor Cott explains, the new marriage ideology was articulated in
the language of economics.145 Specifically, marital unity was defined in terms
of "husband-provider" and "wife-dependent."' 146  While this change was
superficially related to the demise of the legal concept on which the earlier
model was based, the more important factor was the changing needs of the
state. 147 While the "economic substructure of marriage" had always been
139. See CoTn, supra note 62, at 157 ("This public policy emphasis emerged ... while the
doctrine of coverture was being unseated in social thought and substantially defeated in the
law.").
140. See id. at 157, 164, 166 (identifying the prohibition of"sex discrimination in voting"
as the catalyst for changes in the "legal and political status of wives").
141. Id. at 157.
142. See id. (describing marriage as an instrument "to monitor and control" a scattered
population).
143. Id.
144. See id. (explaining the departure from understanding marriage "as a form of direct
political governance").
145. See id. ("[M]arital unity was rewritten economically in the provider/dependent
Model ....").
146. Id. at 157-58 (describing the economic formulation as one "in which the husband
carried more weight").
147. See id. at 158 (discussing the efforts of the federal government to restructure
economic and social relationships during the Great Depression).
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considered essential, it emerged as the dominant vision when the governance
function of marriage receded in importance with the consolidation of state
power in the period between the Civil War and World War 1.148
The final step in the transition to a true system of community property
occurred in the mid-1970s.149 Notwithstanding the 1927 statute's elimination
of the "mere expectancy" doctrine, as a practical matter the statute did not alter
the system of managerial control that existed under prior law because the
husband retained control over community property. Wives were granted
control over their own separate earnings in 1951.150 The changes that occurred
in the 1970s finally gave managerial power to both spouses over property
acquired during the marriage "without regard [for] which of them [was] directly
responsible for earning the property.''5 With the exception of the property of a
business operated by one spouse alone,152 community personal property can be
managed by either spouse acting alone. 53  Either spouse can manage
community real property154 subject to the long-standing requirement of consent
of both parties in the case of transfer or lease.'
55
The 1970s reforms, by which a genuine system of community property
was finally put into place, coincided with the rise of yet another understanding
of the relationship between the family and the state. Borrowing a concept from
the law of church-state relations, Cott describes this latest shift as involving the
"disestablishment" by the state of a single model of the marital relationship. 1
56
Just as state governments had at one time favored and supported particular
churches, since the early nineteenth century family law policy in the United
States promoted or established a particular form of family life.' 57 In the latter
part of the twentieth century, the state backed away from aggressive promotion
of its chosen vision of family life.' 58 This new approach was manifested in,
148. Id. at 157.
149. See Prager, supra note 14, at 73-81 (discussing the elimination of various separate
property concepts from California law during the 1970s).
150. See Prager, supra note 14, at 79 (noting that the 1951 law increased the importance of
"the earnings-management philosophy").
151. Id. at 73-74.
152. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(d) (West Supp. 1983).
153. Id. § 5125(a).
154. Id. § 5127.
155. Id.
156. See COTr, supra note 62, at 12 (comparing the emerging diversity in family
relationship and the end of a single, state enforced model to religious disestablishment). An
",established' religion or 'religious establishment"' is one that is supported by the state. Id
157. See id.
158. See id. at 210-12 (reviewing the judicial and legislative developments that relaxed
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among other changes, the replacement of adversarial fault-based divorce with
no-fault divorce, elimination of the marital rape exemption, and a general
willingness to treat de facto families in the same way as formal marriages.1
59
Public understandings of marriage that dominated American thinking from
the early nineteenth century through the latter part of the twentieth century
inhibited recognition ofjointly owned marital property in which both spouses
have equal rights. There is a basic inconsistency between a system of marital
property that grants both spouses rights in all property acquired during the
marriage and the premises of both the marriage-as-unity and the
provider/dependent models of the marriage. The disestablishment of a state-
sponsored family has significance for the emergence of marital property
because it removed a major barrier to acceptance of the doctrine.
111. Harta Bersama in Indonesia
160
Community property emerged in California after a century-long struggle
between competing conceptions of the economic foundations of marriage. The
debates surrounding the development of a law of joint marital property in
Indonesia focused on a different set of issues. That some form ofjointly owned
marital property would be recognized and enforced was hardly in doubt. 161 The
debate in Indonesia was concerned primarily with specifying the principle by
which jointly owned marital property would be legitimized.
The defining feature of marital property under current Indonesian law is
the recognition of a marital estate that is owned jointly by husband and wife.'
62
This joint property is distinguished from the separate property that belongs to
the spouses individually. 163 The marital estate begins with the commencement
of the marriage and includes all property acquired during the marriage through
state control over intimate relationships).
159. See id at 212 (identifying various examples of changes in national and state policies
indicating that the government had released its "grip on the institution of marriage along with
[its] previous understanding of it").
160. Due to the unavailability of foreign sources, the Washington and Lee Law Review was
unable to verify the accuracy of foreign language sources and translations in this Part.
161. See B. TER HAAR, ADAT LAW IN INDONESlA 1,7-10 (E. Adamson Hoebel & A. Arthur
Schiller eds. & trans., Bhratara 1962) (1948) (recognizing the prevalence of "[t]he rule that
property acquired during marriage is held jointly by husband and wife" and further noting that
"[iut is a great exception if there is no provision at all for such joint property"),
162. See, e.g., infra note 179 and accompanying text.
163. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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the efforts of either of the spouses.' 64 Property owned by either of the spouses
prior to the marriage or acquired during the marriage by gift or inheritance is
not included in the marital estate but remains the separate property of the
owner.165
The Indonesian doctrine of marital property is now rationalized in terms of
Islamic legal categories and applied by Islamic courts, but the origin of the
doctrine is universally attributed to indigenous customary practice or "adat." 1
66
The word adat-an Arabic-derived term that exists in local cognate forms
throughout much of island Southeast Asia167-is a protean concept whose
usage covers a range of meanings not fully captured in the word "custom.'
68
According to one modem authority, adat encompasses "the whole body of
teachings and their observance, which governs the way of life of the Indonesian
people and which has emerged from the people's conceptions of man and
world."'169 This definition refers to the concept of adat, which is recognized
164. See Marriage Act, Law No. 1, art. 35(1) (1974) (Indon.), translated in DEP'TOF INFO.,
REPUBLIC OF INDON., THE INDONESIAN MARRIAGE LAW 20 (1975) ("Property acquired during
marriage shall become joint property.").
165. See id. art. 35(2), translated in DEP'T OF INFO., REPUBLIC OF INDON., THE INDONESIAN
MARRIAGE LAW 20 (1975) ("Property brought in by the husband or the wife respectively and
property acquired by either one of them as a gift or an inheritance shall be under the respective
control of either one of them, provided the parties have not decided otherwise.").
166. See JOHN BALL, INDONESIAN LEGAL HISTORY, 1602-1848, at 65-66 (1982) (discussing
the interaction between Islamic rules and institutions and local adat in the laws of the
archipelago). The characterization of marital property as custom is both a description of its
history or genealogy and a claim about the source and nature of its normative authority;
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL
THEORY 49 (1976) (describing the normative dimension of customary law as "the sentiment of
obligation and entitlement, or the tendency to identify established forms of conduct with the
idea of a right order in society and in the world at large").
167. See Jan Prins, Adatlaw and Muslim Religious Law in Modern Indonesia: An
Introduction, 1 DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 283,284 (195 1) (discussing the Arabic origin of the word
adat and its definition).
168. Clifford Geertz, for example, argues that the concept of adat embodies a characteristic
Southeast Asian "legal sensibility" in which justice is identified with "social consonance."
Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Law and Fact in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIvE ANTHROPOLOGY 208-09 (1983). He notes that
discourse about everyday life utilizes a range of "near-synonyms," including "proper,"
"suitable," "seemly," "fitting," "normal," "harmonious," "apt," "smooth," "supple," and
"pleasant." Id. at 210. Adat, however, is an entire "outlook" not fully captured by any of these.
Id. at 210.
169. BALL, supra note 166, at 65 (citing MOHAMMAD KOESNOE, REPORT ON A CO-
OPERATIVE RESEARCH PROJECT ON ADA TLAW IN BALI AND LOMBOK, 1971-1973 (1978); see also
John R. Bowen, The Transformation of an Indonesian Property System: "Adat," Islam, and
Social Change in the Gayo Highlands, 15 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 274,276 (1988) (describing adat
as "the entire body of ideas and practices" that constitutes and gives identity to a particular
cultural group).
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across the archipelago. It should be emphasized, however, that there is not one
adat observed in island Southeast Asia, but many.17  In its most common
usage, adat refers to the particular beliefs and practices that define and
differentiate the region's many ethnic groups.' 7' Thus, possession of-or
possession by-Javanese adat is what makes a person Javanese, and also what
distinguishes the Javanese, who occupy the eastern two thirds of the island of
Java, from the Sundanese to the west. The total number of adat communities
across the Indonesian archipelago depends on the purpose and refinement of
the classificatory scheme and cannot, of course, be specified with precision.
Estimates of the number of distinct adat communities that exist in Indonesia
range from 19-the number of adat groups identified by the Dutch172 -to more
than 3 00.173
Thus, while the modem doctrine of marital property is commonly said to
be based on adat, it might be more accurate to speak of the doctrine's origin in
the region's adats, because its roots are traced to the many and varied distinct
understandings of the property relations within marriage. Moreover, not all
ethnic communities within Indonesia recognize the concept of jointly owned
marital property. 174 Groups that trace descent exclusively through male blood
lines generally do not have a concept of jointly owned marital property, 75
though a form of marital property is recognized among the patrilineal
Balinese. 176 The doctrine is most strongly associated with ethnic groups that
trace descent bilaterally and therefore lack any sort of corporate descent group.
Because most ethnic groups within Indonesia are bilateral,177 including the
170. See Prins, supra note 167, at 286-89 (describing the diversity of "the field of
ethnological jurisprudence and adatlaw" in the archipelago).
171. See JOHN R. BowEN, IsLAM, LAW AND EQUALITY IN INDONESIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF
PUBLIC REASONING 51 (2003) ("Each corpus of adat law pretended to exhaustively characterize
the norms and behavior to be found in a particular place in the Indies, and it only characterized
norms and behavior found there."). An example of this common usage is found in the title of a
book by one of Indonesia's prominent scholars of adat, R. SOEPOMO, HET ADATPRIVAATRECHT
VAN WEST JAVA (1933).
172. See E. Adamson Hoebel & A. Arthur Schiller, Introduction to TER HAAR, supra note
161, at 7-10 (listing the nineteen adat groups).
173. See BOWEN, supra note 171, at 4 (estimating the number of adat groups based on
conventional calculations).
174. SOERJONO SOEKANTO, HUKUM ADAT INDONESIA [INDONESIAN CUSTOMARY LAW] 249
(1981).
175. See TER HAAR, supra note 161, at 209 ("It is only among patrilineal local groups that
the kin group property of the husband (in case of a bride-price marriage) or of the wife (in case
of an adoptive marriage) leaves no room for building a joint estate.").
176. SOEKANTO, supra note 174, at 249.
177. HAZARIN, HUKUM KEWARISAN BILATERAL MENURUT QUR'AN DAN HADITH [BILATERAL
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region's largest and politically dominant group-the Javanese, 78-the typical
marital property scheme in island Southeast Asia includes joint ownership by
husband and wife. 179 A form of marital property is also found among the
Minangkabau, I80 a large matrilineal group in west Sumatra.
While some form ofjointly owned marital property is recognized by most
inhabitants of island Southeast Asia the practice differs from one region to
another, sometimes substantially.' 8' The differences concern such matters as
whether property acquired through the efforts of one spouse constitutes joint or
separate property; whether income derived from separate property is
categorized as joint or separate; the allocation of authority between the spouses
overjoint and separate property; and the division ofjoint and separate property
when the marriage ends. 8 2 Such issues are often treated differently in villages
within the same district, as illustrated by a 1974 study of customs relating to
family and inheritance in the district of Pandegelang in West Java.' 83 The study
found, for example, that in some villages separate property was not included
within the marital estate, while in other villages it was included. 184 It was also
found that, within a single district, there were multiple approaches to the issue
of the wife's authority to sell her separate property. There is a requirement
throughout the district that the wife may sell her separate property only if her
INHERITANCE LAW ACCORDING TO THE QUR'AN AND HADIrH] 74 (1958).
178. VAN VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 6, at 166.
179. H. HILMAN HADIKUSUMA, HuKuM PERKAWINAN INDONESIA MENURUT PERUNDANGAN,
HUKUM ADAT, HUKUM ISLAM [INDONESIAN MARRIAGE LAW ACCORDING TO STATUTE,
CUSTOMARY LAW, AND ISLAMIC LAW] 125 (2003).
180. Id.
181. See VAN VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 6, at 87, 135-36, 175-76 (discussing the marital
property systems in Aceh, among the Minangkabau of west Sumatra, and central and east Java).
182. Differences also arise from the existence within a particular group of property that
belongs to the community as a whole. Among the Minahasa in northern Celebes (Sulawesi), for
example, "[tihe common estate, the hartapendapatan, comprised only the property gained by
labour of both partners during their marriage," and both parties retained their own personal
possessions or pasini. Sita van Bemmelen, The Marriage of Minahasa Women in the Period
1861-1993, in INDONESIAN WOMEN IN Focus: PAST AND PRESENT NOTIONS 181, 190 (Elsbeth
Locher-Scholten & Anke Niehofeds., 1987). Minahasa adat also recognized a third category of
family property or kelakaran, and "[b]oth the husband and the wife had the right of
allotment... of kelakaran land for their use." Id.
183. LEMBAGA PEMBINAAN HUKUM NASIONAL, HUKUM KELUARGA/ADAT WARIS DI
KABUPATEN PANDEGELANG JAWA BARAT [CUSTOMARY FAMILY AND INHERITANCE LAW IN THE
PANDEGELANG DISTRICT OF WEST JAVA] (1973/1974).
184. Id. at 23. At the time of the study there were four different terms for separate
property-harta sampakan, harta sulur, harta pusaka/turunan, and barang asal-and four
different terms for common property-harta campur kaya, harta guna kaya, harta gono gini,
and harta kaya reujeung. Id. at 31.
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husband is aware of the sale.' 85 In two of the villages, there is a further
requirement that the wife's heirs be aware of the sale, and in five other villages
the sale must be with the knowledge of the wife's family.
186
The customary arrangements governing property within marriage are
naturally related to ideas about the marriage relationship and to the role of
women in the economy and society. A relatively strong and autonomous role
for women seems to be a consistent and long-standing feature of Southeast
Asian life. 187 Mention has been made of the fact that the predominant method
for reckoning kinship and inheritance is bilateral-through both parents. In
addition, gender tends to be conceptualized in complementary rather than
oppositional terms and is not as important as age and rank in the definition of
social hierarchy.188 A particularly striking manifestation of the comparatively
strong position of Southeast Asian women is the practice, once common in
many parts of the region, of men undergoing sometimes painful surgeries on
their penises to enhance the sexual pleasure of women. 189 Reid describes one
procedure as involving "the insertion of a metal pin [near the head of the penis],
complemented by a variety of wheels, spurs, or studs."' 90 Professor Reid also
185. Id. The reason given for the rule is to protect the husband from being required to
indemnify his wife's creditors out of his separate property. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Penny van Estrick, Introduction to WOMEN OF SOUTHEAST ASiA 1, 1 (Penny van
Estrick ed., 1996) ("Southeast Asia has long been identified as an area where women enjoy high
status.").
188. See Shelly Errington, Recasting Sex, Gender, and Power: A Theoretical and
Regional Overview, in POWER AND DIFFERENCE: GENDER IN ISLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 1, 48 (Jane
Monnig Atkinson & Shelly Errington eds., 1990) (summarizing that seniority and generational
layers play a greater role in society than do sex differences).
189. See 1 ANTHONY REID, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE AGE OF COMMERCE, 1450-1680: THE
LANDS BELOW THE WINDS 148 (1988) (describing the details of the painful surgeries men
underwent to increase the erotic pleasure of women).
190. Id. at 149. Professor Reid quotes the following:
The males, large and small, have their penis pierced from one side to the other near
the head with a gold or tin bolt as large as a goose quill. In both ends of the same
bolt some have what resembles a spur, with points upon the ends; others are like the
head of a cart nail. I very often asked many, both old and young, to see their penis,
because I could not credit it. In the middle of the bolt is a hole, through which they
urinate .... They say their women wish it so, and that if they did otherwise they
would not have communication with them. When the men wish to have
communication with their women, the latter themselves take the penis not in the
regular way and commence very gently to introduce it, with the spur on top first,
and then the other part. When it is inside it takes its regular position; and thus the
penis always stays inside until it gets soft, for otherwise they could not pull it out.
Id. (quoting ANTONIO PIGAFETrA, FIRST VOYAGE AROUND THE WORLD 43 (J.A. Robertson trans.,
1969)).
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notes that, in contrast to China, India, and the Middle East, the value of
daughters was never questioned in Southeast Asia; "on the contrary, 'the more
daughters a man has, the richer he is."' 1 9'
The right of women to a share of household production is also clearly
related to the fact that women have consistently played an important role in the
region's predominantly agricultural economy. Javanese custom assigned
certain farming tasks exclusively to men and other tasks exclusively to
women. 192 Men were responsible for plowing, repairing dikes and ditches, and
preparing seed beds, but planting and harvesting was performed by women. 193
Women have also long dominated small-scale trade. 194 Both in Java and
elsewhere women participate in, and in some areas control, household
management and decision-making.195 Among several of the region's cultural
groups, women manage their husbands' incomes.
196
191. Id. at 146 (quoting ANTONIO GALvAo, A TREATISE ON THE MOLUCCAS, PROBABLY THE
PRELIMINARY VERSION OF ANTIONION GALvAO'S LOST HIST6RIA DAS MOLUCAS 89 (Hubert
Jacobs trans., 1971)).
192. See KOENTJARANNGRAT, JAVANESE CULTURE 167(1985) (providing a table depicting
the average number of hours men and women spent at various farming tasks).
193. See id. (providing data that, in 1958, women spent an average of 205 hours
transplanting, 2 hours sowing seeds, and 300 hours harvesting the irrigated rice fields in
Bagelen). Rice was traditionally harvested head-by-head with a small hand-held blade (ani-
ani). Id. at 169.
194. See Barbara Hatley, Theatrical Imagery and Gender Ideology in Java, in POwER AND
DIFFERENCE: GENDER IN ISLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 177, 180 (Jane Monnig Atkinson & Shelly
Errington eds., 1990) (noting petty market trade as an area of agricultural production
predominated by women).
195. See HILDRED GEERTZ, THE JAVANESE FAMILY: A STUDY OF KINSHIP AND
SOCIALIZATION 45-46 (196 1) (explaining how men voluntarily withdraw from household affairs,
leaving family finances and domestic decisions to women); LINDA B. WILLIAMS, DEVELOPMENT,
DEMOGRAPHY, AND FAMILY DECISION-MAKING: THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN RURAL JAVA 87-89
(1990) (presenting data demonstrating that men and women in rural Java have an equal voice in
most major household decisions related to contraception, personal income, and the
discontinuation of childbearing).
196. See Suzanne A. Brenner, Why Women Rule the Roost: Rethinking Javanese
Ideologies of Gender and Self-Control, in BEWITCHING WOMEN, PIOUS MEN: GENDER AND
BODY POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 19, 23 (Aihwa Ong & Michael G. Peletz eds., 1995)
(discussing female control over household finances); Hanna Papanek & Laurel Schwede,
Women are Good with Money: Earning and Managing in an Indonesian City, in A HOME
DIVIDED: WOMEN AND INCOME IN THE THIRD WORLD 71, 88-95 (Daisy Dwyer & Judith Bruce
eds., 1988) (describing the role of women in managing all aspects of domestic finances from the
allotment of pocket money to determining family saving strategies). In her lively ethnography
of home life in 1940s Kelanten in northwest peninsular Malaysia, Rosemary Firth reports:
The real influence of the woman, however, comes from her control over the purse
strings. All money earned by the fisherman is given to the woman both to spend
and to save. The peasants say that this is natural, "for who should guard the money
while we are away all day, if not the woman?" A friend of ours once remarked,
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Among at least some ethnic groups, economic cooperation is fundamental
to popular understandings of marriage. In her landmark study of the Javanese
family in the 1950s, Hildred Geertz found that marriage was understood as
fundamentally an economic partnership. 97 Geertz found that the doctrine of
marital property was directly related to this conception of marriage: "Since
husband and wife are an economic unity, even though the wife may not
participate directly in the acquisition of income, her performance of household
tasks is considered part of the productive economic enterprise." 198 Working in
a very different social and cultural setting, Jane Atkinson identified a similar
attitude toward marriage among the mountain Wana of Sulawesi who live in
small, unstratified settlements with a subsistence economy based on shifting
cultivation, hunting, and foraging. 99 As Atkinson described:
The conjugal relationship is about work. Both young and old, male and
female, stressed industriousness and a capacity for hard labor as attributes
of an ideal spouse. The emphasis on industry goes for both sexes. In
explaining why a wife would be jealous of her husband's lover, one woman
explained that to seduce an unmarried woman, a married man disparages
his own wife. He tells his lover that his wife is lazy, weak, and will not
work for his mother. He proceeds to praise his would-be lover for her
strength and industry. In this way, a man's adultery is an insult to his wife's
worth as a producer and as a considerate daughter-in-law. Similarly,
women will divorce men who are shiftless workers. Wana talk about
marriage brings out the point that both spouses are expected to be hard-
working contributors to their productive units.2°°
when his wife was very ill, that it was difficult because he had to keep an eye on the
cash, which he could not do all the time when he was out and about working. The
same man told us that he did not know exactly how much money his wife had in the
house. If he wanted sums for the purchase of boats or nets, he would ask his wife,
and she would tell him if she thought they could afford it or not. When my
husband bought a small boat, and the question of price was brought forward, the
man said he would have to go home and discuss the matter with his wife before he
could give a definite answer.
ROSEMARY FIRTH, HOUSEKEEPING AMONG MALAY PEASANTS 26-27 (2d ed. 1966).
197. See GEERTZ, supra note 195, at 50 (stating that husband and wife function as an
indivisible economic unit accumulating both personal and community property).
198. Id. at 49.
199. See Jane Monnig Atkinson, How Gender Makes a Difference in Wana Society, in
POWER AND DIFFERENCE: GENDER IN IsLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 59, 59-93 (Jane Monnig Atkinson
& Shelly Errington eds., 1990) (exploring the cultural expressions of gender in the Wana
population-where expressions of sameness are more dominant than expressions of gender
difference).
200. Id. at 68.
1443
64 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1417 (2007)
A spouse's contribution to the marital property was a contribution to the
strength of the marriage.
A. Adatrecht: Custom as Law
The evolution of the doctrine of joint marital property and its
incorporation into the formal legal system is due in large part to the role
assigned to adat by the Dutch. Dutch legal policy was based on the principle
that each group within the population should be subject to its own law.2' This
policy resulted in the division of the population into three "law groups":
"Europeans," "foreign Orientals," and "Natives., 20 2 The most favored group
was Europeans, which included Netherlanders and other Europeans, but also
Japanese and nationals of other countries whose family law was similar to that
of the Netherlands. 20 3 Indigenous Indonesians comprised the vast majority.
2°4
A residual category of "foreign Orientals" was comprised principally of
Chinese, Arabs, and British Indians.
20 5
Family law for those categorized as Europeans was based on the Dutch
Civil Code.206 Parts of the Civil Code were also made applicable to some
within the group of foreign Orientals, 20 7 and a statute passed in 1933 created a
special law of marriage for Indonesian Christians in Java and parts of eastern
Indonesia.20 8 For the rest of the non-European population, the law of marriage
and inheritance was based on the custom or adat of the parties.20 9
Dutch policy assigned no formal role to Islamic doctrine in marriage or
any other area of law. Arabs resident in the Indies were subject to Islamic
marriage and inheritance rules, but the binding character of Islamic doctrine
was not related to its religious authority. Rather, the law for Arabs was based
201. This policy received its first formal recognition in Section 75 of the Constitution of
the Indies (Regeringsreglement) of 1854. That section provided that native courts were to apply
"the religious laws, institutions and customs of the natives, insofar as they are not in conflict
with generally recognized principles of fairness and justice." H.W.J. Sonius, Introduction to
VAN VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 6, at LVIII (internal citations omitted).
202. Sudargo Guatama, The Marriage Laws of Indonesia with Special Reference to Mixed
Marriages, in ESSAYS IN INDONESIAN LAw 147, 149 (1991).
203. Id. at 150.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 151.
207. Id. at 154.
208. Id. at 153.
209. Id. at 155.
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on Islamic doctrine because Islamic law was the customary law of Arabs.
210
Under what is known as the "reception theory," the same principle was applied
to indigenous Indonesian Muslims; Muslims in the Indies were subject to
Islamic rules insofar as those rules had been received into the local custom or
adat.
211
Under the reception theory the scope of the applicability of Islamic
doctrine was ostensibly an empirical question: Which Islamic rules had
achieved the status of custom? Although the question by its nature does not
lend itself to clear-cut resolution, a determination was made that Islamic rules
of marriage and divorce had become customary, but other aspects of Islamic
doctrine had not.212 Thus, the rules for Indonesian Muslims regarding the
formation of marriage and the requirements and mechanisms for divorce were
based on Islamic doctrine, whereas the law of inheritance was based on adat.
2 13
Indonesia declared its independence and promulgated a national
constitution in 1945.214 That constitution declared that colonial era laws were
to remain in effect pending the enactment of national law,215 preserving both
the role of adat as a principal source of law and the subordinate status of
210. Id.
211. LEV, supra note 1, at 196-97.
212. See HARRY J. BENDA, THE CRESCENT AND THE RISING SUN: INDONESIAN ISLAM UNDER
THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION 1942-1945, at 22 (1958) ("[W]hile Koranic law had gained
acceptance in the realm of marital and family law, in almost all other matters, the Indonesian
adat had prevailed."). Dutch assessments of the influence of Islamic legal doctrines on
Indonesian practice changed significantly over the course of Dutch rule. Dutch administrators
initially assumed that because the people were Muslim they followed Islamic law. See
Azyumardi Azra, The Indonesian Marriage Law of 1974: An Institutionalization of the Shar'
for Social Changes, in SHARI'A AND POLITICS IN MODERN INDONESIA 76, 79 (Arskal Salim &
Azyumardi Azra eds., 2003) (explaining the realization by the Dutch of the difference between
Indonesian adat law and Islamic law and the subsequent Dutch adoption of adat law as a way to
curb the progress of Islamic law). When the Dutch later began to attend to legal practice, it
quickly became apparent that the situation was more complicated than had previously been
believed. Research on indigenous legal practice led the Dutch to conclude that Islamic legal
institutions had a relatively minor impact on indigenous practice. See H. Westra, Custom and
Muslim Law in the Netherlands East Indies, 25 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 151,
165 (1939) (discussing in detail the regulations and customary law of the indigenous
population).
213. See Prins, supra note 167, at 290-91 (describing the creation and dissolution of
marriages as solely concerned with Islamic standards and the distribution of property centered
around the principals of adat).
214. Daniel S. Lev, Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State, 40 INDONESIA
57, 69-70 (1985).
215. See INDON. CONST. Transitional Provisions, cl. II ("All existing state institutions and
regulations shall continue to function as long as new ones have not been established or
introduced in accordance with the Constitution.").
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Islamic legal institutions. Thus, on matters governed by adat the Indonesian
courts, like the predecessor colonial courts, were obliged to discover and
216enforce the customary rules applicable to the parties or the transaction.
Although the courts were able to cut through some of the complexity of this
scheme by relying on the Dutch construct of nineteen adat groups sharing
fundamentally similar rules, the system was nonetheless cumbersome and, in
the view of some, ill-suited to the needs of a modem national state.217 One
perceived advantage of adat for the Dutch was that the particularity of its local
manifestations was regarded as a hindrance to the development of a common
political consciousness.218 After independence the disintegrative potential of
adat was no longer a benefit but a problem. The solution was to retain the
concept of adat but not its specific rules. 219 This not only alleviated the threat
of adat as a disintegrative force, but also transformed the concept into a basis
for national self-definition and unification.22 °
The transformation of adat was the accomplishment of the Indonesian
Supreme Court.22' Over the period of about a decade, beginning in the mid-
1950s, the Court issued a number of decisions announcing changes to specific
doctrines for particular adat groups.222 These decisions brought about a
gradual convergence of adat doctrines around a single standard that eventually
resulted in the declaration of a single "Indonesian" adat. In the process the
concept of adat itself was fundamentally altered.
216. See Lev, supra note 214, at 69-70 (arguing that without new statutory direction, the
courts invoked previously applicable principles of adat creating conflicts between existing
codes and customs).
217. S. TAKDIR ALISJAHBANA, INDONESIA: SOCIAL AND CuLTuRAL REVOLUTION 70-71
(1966); see S. TAKDIR ALISJAHBANA, INDONESIA: IN THE MODERN WORLD 100-09 (Benedict R.
Anderson trans., 1961) (noting defenders of the Dutch system, which applied different laws to
different residents, argued it showed respect for cultural attitudes and produced law that was the
evolutionary product of a nation's growth while critics labeled it backwards and impractical in a
complex, modem world).
218. See Lev, supra note 214, at 66 (noting that Dutch researchers understood adat law as
persisting best in closed communities causing the researchers to treat local communities as if
they were closed).
219. Mark E. Cammack, Inching Toward Equality: Recent Developments in Indonesian
Inheritance Law, 5 INDON. L. & ADMIN. REV. 19, 20 (1999).
220. See generally PETER BURNS, THE LEIDEN LEGACY: CONCEPTS OF LAW IN INDONESIA
(2004).
221. See generally Daniel S. Lev, The Supreme Court and Adat Inheritance Law in
Indonesia, 11 Am. J. COMP. L. 205 (1962) (providing a full development of the Supreme Court's
transformation of adat).
222. See id. at 215-22 (describing the changes to inheritance law made by the courts).
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The Supreme Court's first major pronouncement on adat rules relating to
family life was in 1956.223 That case declared a seemingly uniform rule with
respect to two important issues. First, the Court rejected the argument that a
spouse who does not contribute financially to the household is not entitled to
marital property.224 Technically the issue before the Court was limited to the
question of Javanese adat.225 But the Court framed its decision in unqualified
terms, stating that under adat law all property acquired during the marriage is
marital property, even if the property is derived from the efforts of the husband
alone.226 The second issue concerned the question of misconduct as a bar to
marital property. Citing Islamic rather than adat principles, the husband in the
case argued that his wife forfeit her right to marital property because she had
abandoned the marital home.227 The Court dismissed the argument, stating first
that the wife's entitlement to marital property is governed by adat rather than
Islam, and second, that under adat the alleged misconduct does not affect
marital property rights.228
The Supreme Court addressed another important aspect of marital property
doctrine in a 1959 decision dealing with size of the spouses' share of marital
property under Javanese adat.2 29 The lower courts had decided the case in line
with the predominant view that a surviving husband is entitled to a two-thirds
share of the marital property.230 The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that
changing social conditions and evolving notions of justice require that the
spouses receive an equal share of the marital property.23'
Marital property issues made up only one segment of the Supreme Court's
adat law docket, and the movement toward establishment of a national adat
encompassed other matters as well.232 The important point for present purposes
is that the Supreme Court gradually constructed a body of basic marital
property principles that were eventually extended to all Indonesians regardless
223. Supreme Court No. 51K/Sip/1956 (Nov. 7, 1956), reprinted in R. SUBEKTI & J.
TAMARA, KUMPULAN PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH AGUNG MENGENAI HuKUM ADAT [SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS ON CUSTOMARY LAW] 47 (1961).





229. Supreme Court No. 387K/Sip/1958 (Feb. 11, 1959), reprinted in SUBEKTI & J.
TAMARA, supra note 223, at 50.
230. Id. at 52.
231. Id.at57-58.
232. See Lev, supra note 221, at 215-22 (analyzing this process focusing on the law of
inheritance).
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of ethnic identity. 33 The impact of the Court's decisions on popular practice is
uncertain. Certainly, the Court did not completely eliminate diversity of local
practice with respect to marital property. What the Court achieved, rather, was
the creation of the idea of a uniform national marital property doctrine.
B. The Islamic Concept of Marital Property
The adat doctrine of joint marital property continues to be applied by
Indonesian civil courts.234 But the concept of marital property has also long
been rationalized in terms of Islamic legal categories and enforced by Islamic
tribunals. The content of Islamic marital property law has tended to follow
developments of the doctrine within adat. Indeed, the Islamic authorities
appear to have simply absorbed changes made to the adat doctrine, and the
addition of an Islamic rationale added nothing substantive to the existing
customary law. The significance of the Indonesian Islamic concept of marital
property consists not in the details of the doctrine but in the fact that it exists at
all.
The canon of received doctrine within Islamic law is contained in a vast
scholarly literature referred to as fiqh. While the rights and obligations of
spouses are addressed in some detail in the Islamic law of marriage,"' standard
works of Islamic jurisprudence do not include a doctrine of marital property.
Women may own property under Islamic law,236 and the right of women to
inherit is expressly'recognized within the law of inheritance.2 37 But property
233. In 1971 the High Court for Medan upheld a wife's claim for harta bersama, even
though the couple were from South Tapanuli-an area that did not recognize a doctrine of
marital property. Decision of the High Court for Medan No. 389/1971 (Dec. 30, 1971). In its
decision the court stated that, in accordance with the legal development in Indonesia, only the
property acquired during marriage is partnership property (harta syarikat) that must be divided
equally upon divorce. Id. at 169. This decision was later approved by the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court K/Sip/1972 (May 23, 1973).
234. See, e.g., Decision of the Civil Court for Kebumen No. 42/1986 (Oct. 8, 1987),
reprinted in YURISPRUDENSI MAHKAMAH AGUNG RI [SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE] 106
(1991) (awarding marital property in an inheritance case).
235. For a concise statement of established marriage doctrine in one of the four major
schools of thought, see AHMAD IBN NAQIB AL-MIsRI, RELIANCE OF THE TRAVELLER: THE CLASSIC
MANUAL OF ISLAMIC SACRED LAW 508-53 (Nuh Ha Mim Keller trans., 1994).
236. See SCHACHT, supra note 8, at 126-27 (noting that men and women enjoy equal rights
under Islamic property laws).
237. The right of female relatives to a share of the inheritance is expressly stated in the
Qur'dn. With respect to daughters the Qur 'n states:
As for the children, God decrees that the share of the male is equivalent to that of
two females. If they consist of women only, and of them more than two, they will
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rights within marriage are not treated as a separate subject of analysis, and there
is no concept of jointly owned marital property.238 The doctrine of marital
property was incorporated into Indonesian Islamic law by conceptualizing
property within marriage in terms of Islamic commercial law doctrines.
Specifically, marriage was construed as a form of partnership, and property
acquired during marriage as partnership assets.239
The doctrinal discussion of marital property as a form of Islamic
partnership has been going on for at least a century, and the issue has been
240addressed by a variety of Islamic authorities in a range of different contexts.
Professor Michael Feener and I have addressed the subject at greater length
elsewhere.24' In this Article I do no more than summarize some of the main
points made there.
The first formal articulation of an Islamic rationale for marital property is
commonly attributed to a late eighteenth century scholar from south Borneo
(Kalimantan) named Arshad al-Banjari.242  Al-Banjari is reputed to have
advanced the theory of marital property as a form of partnership in a text on
inheritance entitled al-Fard 'idh.243 While other works by al-Banjari are in wide
get two-thirds of the inheritance; but in case there is one, she will inherit one half.
AL-QUR'AN: A CONTEMPORARY TRANSLATION 4:11, at 74 (Ahmed Ali trans., 1984).
238. M. YAHYA HARAHAP, KEDUDUKAN, KEWENANGAN, DAN ACARA PERADILAN AGAMA
[THE PosITIoN, AuTHORITY, AND PROCEDURE OF THE RELIGIOUS COURTS] 271 (2d ed. 2001).
239. One important piece of evidence for the widespread assimilation of marital property to
Islamic legal concepts is the use throughout Muslim Southeast Asia of an Arabic term for joint
marital property. Each of the region's many ethnic communities has its own terminology for
jointly owned marital property. In addition to the various vernacular labels, however, one also
finds region-wide use of a term for marital property that is based on the Arabic word sharika,
which is the technical term used within Islamic law for commercial partnership. See, e.g.,
ArMAD IBRAHIM, FAMILY LAW IN MALAYSIA 311 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing Malaysian cases in
which wives claimed "harta sharikat"); 29 ADATRECHTBUNDELS 191-92 (1928) (reporting a
decision of the Islamic court for Temate granting "sarikat" to wife of deceased); VAN
VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 6, at 87 (discussing adat practice in Aceh categorizing common
property as "laba mocarikat").
240. See Mark E. Cammack & J. Michael Feener, Joint Marital Property in Indonesian
Customary, Islamic, and National Law, in THE LAW APPLIED: CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISLAMIC
SHARI'A (Wolfhart Heinrichs, Bernard Weiss & Peri Bearman eds., 2007) (tracing the history of
the incorporation of customary marital property doctrine into Islamic law).
241. Id.
242. ENSIKLOPEDI HUKUM IsLAM [ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAMIC LAW] 191 (1996).
243. Published references to al-Banjari's theory of marital property are all apparently based
on an article by Abdurrahman Wahid published in the journal Pesantren in 1985. Abdurrahman
Wahid, Pengembangan Fiqh yang Kontekstual [Creating an Islamic Jurisprudence that is
Contextual], 11:2 PESANTREN 3 (1983). According to Wahid, al-Banjari based his recognition of
marital property on his observations of the social and economic conditions in which he lived
and the contrast between the roles of women in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. After his
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circulation, 244 efforts to locate the al-Fard 'idh, or even to confirm its existence,
have so far proven unsuccessful.
The usual method for obtaining answers to novel or unresolved legal
issues within the Islamic tradition is to request a legal opinion orfatwa from a
scholar.245 There is no central authority within Islam, and the Islamic legal
tradition has always been characterized by significant doctrinal diversity.246
Historically, individual scholars who were consulted because of their reputation
for knowledge of the law, performed the role of mufti.247 While the practice of
seekingfatwa from individual mufti is still common, in many countries Muslim
organizations, and often the state, issue more or less official fatwa for the
benefit of their members or citizens.248
In Indonesia there are a number of prominent Muslim organizations that
issuefatwa.249 The largest and probably most influential such organization, the
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), addressed the doctrine ofjoint marital property in its
very first congress in 1926.250 The question posed to the fatwa committee
framed the issue in narrow terms. It asked:
return from a long period of study in Mecca, al-Banjari took note of the fact that the economic
circumstances in his home region of south Borneo demanded the participation of both men and
women in fishing, trade, and agriculture. Id. at 4. In recognition of this social reality in which
economic production was a collaborative endeavor of both spouses, al-Banjari determined that
wives were entitled to a share of any wealth generated during the marriage upon termination of
the marriage through death or inheritance. Id.
244. Al-Banjari is best known for his Sabl al-muhtahdan, a work of standard Islamic
jurisprudence or fiqh on legal doctrines relating to ritual practice. This text, which was
commissioned in 1779, is still available in Indonesian book stores.
245. See generally Muhammad Khalid Masud et al., Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal
Interpretation, in IsLAMIc LEGAL INTERPRETATION: MUMS AND THEIR FATWAS 3 (Muhammad
Khalid Masud et al. eds., 1996) (providing a general introduction to the role offatwas in Islamic
law).
246. See SCHACHT, supra note 8, at 3 (describing Islamic law's reliance on both narrowly
focused Islamic materials such as the Qur'dn and modem legislation that interferes with
traditional norms).
247. See Masud et al., supra note 245, at 15-20 (describing the qualifications of a
candidate for the muftiship).
248. See C. van Dijk, Religious Authority, Politics and Fatwa in Contemporary Southeast
Asia, in ISLAMIc LAW IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA: IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS 44, 62-65 (R.
Michael Feener & Mark E. Cammack eds., 2007) (discussing the state sponsored fatwa
institutions in Singapore and Malaysia).
249. See generally Rifyal Ka'bah, Islamic Law in Court Decisions and Fatwa Institutions
in Indonesia, in ISLAMIc LAW N CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA, supra note 248, at 83 (providing a
discussion of the majorfatwa bodies in Indonesia).
250. AzIZ MAsYHURI, MASALAH KEAGAMAAN NAHDLATUL ULAMA: HASILMUKTAMAR DAN
MUNAS ULAMA KESATU- 1926 S/D KEDUA PULUH SEMBILAN 1994 [RELIGIOUS ISSUES [PRESENTED
TO] NAHDLATUL ULAMA: RESULTS OF THE CONGRESSES AND NATIONAL COUNCILS OF RELIGIOUS
SCHOLARS FROM THE FIRST IN 1926 UP UNTIL THE TWENTY-NINTH IN 1994], at 6 (1997).
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Is it permissible to award marital property (gono-gini), the [fruits of the]
efforts of husband and wife both [in cases where] each [spouse] possesses
capital and in cases where they do not, but the profits [from their joint
efforts] cannot be differentiated in terms of who is responsible (they have
combined to become one).25'
The committee's answer stated simply that gono gini is permissible on the
authority of a text entitled Hashiya 'ala sharh al-tahrir written by Abdallah al-
Sharqawi (d. 1812).252 The Committee then quotes the passage referenced in
its pronouncement.253 Significantly, the quotation is taken from the chapter of
the text on partnership, not the chapter on the law of marriage. The passage
discusses that when profits from a partnership cannot be attributed to the efforts
of a particular individual they may be shared but, to the extent the source of the
profits is known, they belong to the party who earned them.254
The 1926 pronouncement reflects a qualified acceptance of marital
property on the basis of principles from the law of partnership. A second
pronouncement on the issue released the following year limits the doctrine even
further.255 The question this time was whether, in the absence of an agreement
between the spouses, a wife who performs domestic duties in her husband's
home is thereby entitled to either compensation or marital property.256 Without
explanation, the Committee states simply that under the stipulated conditions a
right to marital property does not arise.257
The NU issued its third fatwa on marital property in 1960.25" The
pronouncement was made in response to a request submitted by an NU branch
that the Committee reconsider its original 1926 ruling. In its response the
committee stated that, upon reconsideration, it found gono gini permissible
based on agreement of the heirs rather than on the basis of God's law.259 When
the heirs agree to permit an award of marital property, the division should be
carried out in accordance with the principles stated in the 1926 ruling.
251. Id.
252. The Hashiya 'ala sharh al-tahrir, popularly known as Syarqawi ala Tahrir, is a
review of the work by Zakariya' al-Ansari, which is itself based on another text by al-Mahamili,
the Lubab al-fiqh.
253. MASYHURi, supra note 250, at 6.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 14.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 230.
259. Id.
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The fullest discussion of marital property as a form of Islamic partnership
is contained in the writings of contemporary Islamic legal scholars. The
Indonesian jurist, Ismail Muhammad Syah, has made an exhaustive analysis of
the compatibility of Indonesian marital property with Islamic partnership
doctrine.26 ° Syah, popularly known by the acronym "Ismuha," begins by laying
out the key features of Indonesian marital property.261 To keep this discussion
within manageable limits, he confines the discussion to the customary practices
among the Javanese and among the inhabitants of the Aceh region of
Sumatra.262 He then surveys the Islamic law of partnership, describing the
terms and requirements of the various types and sub-types of commercial
partnerships approved in the classical literature.263 Ismuha then compares the
results to determine whether any of the approved partnership forms match up
264with marital property practice.
Ismuha concludes that Islamic law sanctions the institution of harta
bersama because it coincides with a form of partnership called sharikat al-
'abdin mufJwadha or "unlimited partnership of labor. ' 265 The distinctive
features of a sharikat al- 'abdan mufwadha are that the contribution of the
parties to the venture is in the form of labor rather than capital, and that each of
the partners has the authority to act on behalf of the others and assume the
undertakings of other partners.266 Marriage qualifies as sharikat al- 'abd~n
mufawadha, according to Ismuha, because "both husband and wife both exert
themselves to the utmost to provide for the daily needs of the family," and
because everything gained during the marriage constitutes joint property except
for that which is inherited or received by gift.
267
260. ISMAILMUHAMMADSYAH, PENcAHARIANBERSAMASuAMIISTERIDIINDONESIA: GONO
GINI DITINJAU DAR] SUDUT HUKUM IsLAM [MARITAL PROPERTY IN INDONESIA: GONO GINI
EXAMINED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF IsLAMIC LAW] (1977).
261. Id. at 36-54.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 55-77. The Islamic law of partnership, like most subjects in Islamic law, is
complicated by the fact that there are a number of doctrinal schools or maddhab within Islamic
law, and the doctrine differs among the various schools. See generally N.J. COULSON, A
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 86-102 (1964). The task of assimilating Indonesian marital property
to Islamic partnership principles is complicated by the fact that the school of law that is
predominant in Indonesian-the Shdf1 '7 school-recognizes a comparatively limited number of
partnership forms. SCHACHT, supra note 8, at 66.
264. SYAH, supra note 260, at 78-79.
265. Id. at 78.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 78-89.
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Ismuha's analysis has garnered wide but not universal acceptance.
268
Ibrahim Hosen, another prominent Indonesian scholar of Islamic law, has
questioned the conclusion that any single form of partnership can encompass all
the various domestic arrangements found in Indonesia. 269 Endorsing the
enforcement of marital property under Islamic law, Hosen argues that in order
to justify this practice, Islamic Law should recognize a broader array of
partnership forms. 270 He argues that the concept of sharikat al 'abdin cannot
justify marital property in marriages in which only one of the spouses is
economically productive.271 However, joint marital property is permissible in
such marriages under a form of partnership known as Qirddh or mudhdraba, in
which one of the parties to the joint effort contributes capital and the other
272contributes labor.
For at least a century and possibly much longer, Indonesian Islamic
tribunals have routinely enforced the doctrine that property acquired during
marriage is owned by the spouses jointly during the marriage and is divided
between them when the marriage ends by death or divorce. The earliest
judicial treatment of marital property that I have been able to find is an 1884
inheritance judgment by the Islamic court (the RaadAgama) for Blitar, a city in
273east Java. The case involved the division of the estate of a man named
Singotruno.274 The written judgment consists ofjust three short paragraphs and
does not explicitly mention marital property.275 Marsidin, son of the deceased,
Maniah, daughter of the deceased, and Kadimah, widow of the deceased,
requested the court to divide the estate valued at Rp. 102.276 The decision
names two witnesses as having confirmed the basic facts.2 77 Without
explanation, the court declares the result: The daughter takes a residual
268. See, e.g., ENSIKLOPEDI HuKUM ISLAM, supra note 242, at 389-91 (adopting Ismuha's
analysis in its entirety).
269. Ibrahim Hosen, Harta Bersama Suami Isteri dan Kaitannya dengan Harta
Peninggalan [Marital Property and its Relation to Heritable Property], in HUKUM WARIs
ISLAM: LAPORAN HASIL SEMINAR [ISLAMIC INHERITANCE LAW: SEMINAR REPORT] 22-26
(Direktorat Pembinaan Badan Peradilan Agama ed., 1983).
270. Id. at 24-26.
271. Id. at 24.
272. Id. at 25-26.
273. Decision of the RaadAgama for Blitar No. 64/1884 (Oct. 26, 1884), reprinted in
HIMPUNAN PUTUSAN/PENETAPAN PENGADILAN AGAMA [COLLECTED DECISIONS/DECREES OF THE
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(asabah) share of Rp.19.8; the son takes a residual share of Rp.39.6; and the
wife takes a combined portion of Rp.42.5. 278  Two works of Islamic
jurisprudence are mentioned-the Fath al-wahhab and the Muharrar-but the
decision does not cite specific passages from these texts, and the relevance of
the cited works to the decision is unclear.279
Even though the court does not explain its reasoning, one can reconstruct
the decision by working backwards from the result. Standard interpretations of
Islamic inheritance law assign specified fractional shares of the estate to the
deceased's relatives. 280 The size of the share and the entitlement to inherit
depend on who among the potential heirs is alive when the deceased dies.28' In
the case of a man survived by his wife, a son, and a daughter-the situation
presented in the case of Singotruno-the wife receives one-eighth of the
inheritance and the children divide the remainder according to the ratio of two
parts to the son to one part to the daughter.282 In Java, where the Singotruno
case arose, the wife typically received a one-third share of the marital
property.283 Assuming the usual 2:1 division of the marital property, the
property belonging to Singotruno when he died that was subject to inheritance
was two-thirds of Rp. 102 or Rp.68 (2/3 x 102). As her husband's heir, the wife
takes a one-eighth share of this amount or Rp.8.5. Of the Rp.59.5 that remains,
the son receives a two-thirds portion or Rp.39.6, and the daughter receives one-
third or Rp. 19.8. The wife's inheritance share of Rp.8.5 is added to her share
of the marital property (which she owns by virtue of the marriage and not as her
husband's heir) to give her a sum total of Rp.42.5.
While the court that decided the Singotruno case did not expressly
recognize the doctrine of joint marital property, other inheritance decisions
from Islamic courts during the pre-independence period do endorse this
278. Id.
279. Id. The Fath al-wahhab is a commentary by Zakariya' Ansari on his own Manhaj al-
tullab, and the Muharrar by Rafi'i (d. 1226) is a standardfiqh text within the Shdfi'T school of
law. See Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren
Milieu, 146 BIJDRAGEN TOT DE TAAL-, LAND- EN VOLKENKUNDE 226, 226-69 (1990) (providing
an overview of the various texts used in pesantren throughout Indonesia).
280. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (mentioning the share of wealth the wife is
entitled to at the death of her husband).
281. See NOELJ. COULSON, SUCCESSION IN THE MUSLIM FAMILY 31-39 (1971) (describing
the hierarchy of legal heirs within Islamic inheritance practices).
282. Id. at 41.
283. Koentjaraningrat, Tjelapar: A Village in South Central Java, in VILLAGES IN
INDONESIA 258-59 (1967). In some cases, however, the marital estate was divided evenly
between the spouses. See, e.g., Decision of the RaadAgama for Banyuwangi No Number/1 902
(Jan. 20, 1902), reprinted in HIMPUNAN PUTUSAN/PENETAPAN, supra note 273, at 383 (allotting
one-half of the marital property to the surviving wife).
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doctrine. Typical of inheritance decisions from this era is the case of the estate
of Haji Mohammad Saleh decided by the Islamic court for Semarang in central
Java in 1922.2 4 The suit was filed by the deceased's wife, who stated that her
husband had died some thirteen years previous but the inheritance had not yet
been divided.285 Before dividing the estate, the court first stated that the marital
property the deceased owned jointly with his wife was to be divided equally.
286
The property subject to inheritance (tirkah), therefore, consisted of half of the
287marital property plus the deceased's separate property. In addition to her half
share of the marital property, the wife also received a one-eighth share of the
inheritance-the portion prescribed in the Qur'dn for a wife when the deceased
was also survived by children.288
In addition to applying marital property doctrine in inheritance cases, the
Islamic courts in the pre-independence period also applied the doctrine in suits
by divorced wives seeking their share of joint property.289 At the time these
cases were decided, a husband could divorce his wife unilaterally by simply
uttering the repudiation or talak, and all of the suits for division of marital
property were filed by women against their former husbands who had
repudiated them.290 In all of the cases the wife's request was granted, at least in
part.2 9 ' Although the cases never clearly spell out the legal or conceptual basis
for the doctrine of joint marital property, neither the existence of marital
property nor the wife's entitlement to a share of the marital estate were
seriously contested.292 It is apparent from the tenor of the decisions that the
284. Decision of the RaadAgama for Semarang No. 161/1922 (Sept. 26, 1922), reprinted
in HIMPUNAN PUTUSAN/PENETAPAN, supra note 273, at 281.
285. Id. at 282.
286. Id. at 283.
287. Id. at 283.
288. Id. at 283. In addition to his wife, the deceased was also survived by three children-
two sons, and a daughter. At the time the suit was filed, however, all three children had died,
and the estate was divided among the deceased's grandchildren. Id. at 284.
289. See, e.g., Decision of the Raad Agama for Kraksaan No. 23/1907 (Dec. 8, 1907),
reprinted in HIMPUNAN PUTUSAN/PENETAPAN, supra note 273, at 199 (granting a wife's suit for
division of marital property).
290. See, e.g., Decision of the Raad Agama for Jember No. 241/1935 (July 21, 1935),
reprinted in HIMPUNAN PUTUSAN/PENETAPAN, supra note 273, at 216 (noting the wife's
testimony that she had been repudiated by her husband seven months earlier).
291. In some of the cases I have reviewed, the couples negotiated a settlement to the wife's
claim that was then approved by the court. See, e.g., Decision of the RaadAgama for Tuban
No. 62/1921 (June 26, 1921), reprinted in HIMPUNAN PUTUSAN/PENETAPAN, supra note 273, at
201 (noting the wife's agreement to drop her claim for marital property in exchange for receipt
of gold ring).
292. The decisions occasionally include the wife's representation that she and her husband
had both worked the fields and that she was therefore entitled to a share of the marital property.
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courts feel no need to justify the law of joint marital property because the
doctrine is settled beyond dispute. As far as I have been able to determine, the
only legal authority cited by the courts that discusses the doctrine of joint
marital property is a text titled Kitzb qawdnTn al-shar'iyya, a late eighteenth
century work by an Indonesian scholar from Hadramaut named Sayyid
Uthman.293 In referring to marital property, the courts use both adat
terminology (gono gini; guna kaya) and also local derivations of the Arabic
word sharika.294 A number of the decisions use a verbal form of the word
syarikat (disyarikat) to refer to the act of dividing joint property, a construction
never found for adat terms.295 In one case the plaintiff requested the court to
divide the marital property (gono gini) according to the "religious law" (hukum
agama).296
Indonesian independence brought few changes to Islamic legal institutions
or the application of Islamic legal doctrines.297 The Indonesian Islamic courts
continued to apply the doctrine ofjoint marital property much as the colonial
era courts had done.298 Beginning almost immediately after independence,
however, the new nationalist leaders began working toward a codification of
the law of marriage. 299 Reaching agreement on marriage law proved difficult,
and it was not until 1974 that substantive marriage legislation was passed.3 °°
See, e.g., Decision of the Raad Agama for Jepara No. 1/1935 (Mar. 3, 1935), reprinted in
HIMPUNAN PUTUSAN/PENETAPAN, supra note 273, at 211 (including the wife's statement to the
court that she and her husband had worked together as rice farmers).
293. Kitdb qawdnn al-shar'iyya is an Arab-scripted Malay text that was written as a
reference for manual colonial-era Islamic judges. The book is still in print, and copies can be
found in Islamic book shops in Jakarta and possibly elsewhere. See Van Bruinessen, supra note
279, at n.8.
294. See, e.g., Decision of the RaadAgama for MajalengkaNo. 58/1930 (July 12, 1930),
reprinted in HIMpuNAN PUTUSAN/PENETAPAN, supra note 273, at 207 (discussing a situation in
which the wife requests division of "sarikat").
295. See, e.g., Decision of the Raad Agama for Berbes No. 40/1922 (Feb. 19, 1922),
reprinted in HIMPUNAN PUTUSAN/PENETAPAN, supra note 273, at 203 (noting an instance in
which the wife claims before the court that the property has not yet been "disirkat" and the court
announces in its order that the property is to be "disirkat"-two parts for the husband and one
part for the wife).
296. Decision of the RaadAgama for Kraksaan No. 23/1907 (Dec. 8, 1907), reprinted in
HIMPUNAN PUTUSAN/PENETAPAN, supra note 273, at 199.
297. See generally LEV, supra note 1.
298. See id. at 30 (noting that the changes that occurred to the Islamic Judiciary during the
colonial era remained following independence).
299. CORA VREEDE DE STUERS, THE INDONESIAN WOMAN: STRUGGLES AND ACHIEVEMENTS
124-39 (1960).
300. See Mark E. Cammack, Islamic Law in Indonesia's New Order, 38 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 53, 53 (1989) (describing Muslim resistance to Indonesia's proposed national marriage
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The doctrine ofjoint marital property was not a significant point of contention,
however. All of the marriage law proposals that were debated in the 1950s and
the 1960s provided forjoint marital property, and the doctrine ofjointly owned
marital property is recognized in the 1974 Marriage Act.
30 1
The Marriage Act provisions dealing with marital property contain only
the barest outlines of the doctrine. Article 35 defines marital property, or harta
bersama, as "property that is acquired during the marriage. 30 2 Property owned
by either spouse prior to the marriage or acquired by means of gift or
inheritance during the marriage is declared to be under the control of the
respective owner except insofar as the parties agree otherwise.30 3 The next
article states that management of marital property is based on the agreement of
the parties but that both husband and wife have complete legal authority with
respect to their own separate property.3°4 The final provision regarding marital
property states simply that when marriage ends in divorce, harta bersama is to
be dealt with based on the law of the parties.30 5 The official comment to this
article clarifies that the "law of the parties" refers to "religious, adat, or other
law.
306
The so-called Compilation of Islamic Law contains a fuller treatment of
the doctrine of marital property as it applies to Indonesian Muslims. The
Compilation is a code of marriage and inheritance rules that representatives of
the Ministry of Religion and of the Indonesian Supreme Court drafted for use
by the Islamic courts. 307 The code was never submitted to the legislature, but
was promulgated in 1991 through a presidential instruction.30 8 As the title
suggests, the Compilation purports to represent a mere restatement of existing
Indonesian Islamic legal principles.30 9 The stated purpose of the Compilation is
to provide a uniform and accessible body of rules for use by judges in deciding
the cases that come before Indonesia's Islamic courts.31 °
bill).
301. Marriage Act, Law No. 1, art. 35(1) (1974) (Indon.).
302. Id. art. 35(2).
303. Id.
304. Id. arts. 36(1) & 36(2).
305. Id. art. 37.
306. This language was added during the revisions of the bill in the legislature; the original
proposal would have specified an equal division of marital property. Draft Marriage Act, art. 39
(Indon.).
307. See Mawardi, supra note 3, at 127 (describing the background and promulgation of
the Compilation).
308. Id. at 131.
309. Id. at 125.
310. M. Yahya Harahap, Informasi Materi Kompilasi Hukum Islam: Mempositikan
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The marital property provisions of the Compilation appear to resolve
disagreements over the doctrine and bring the Islamic rules into line with the
adat doctrine. The marital estate arises by virtue of the marriage, and unless
the parties specify otherwise, all property acquired during the marriage qualifies
as marital property regardless of which party earned it and irrespective of which
spouse formally holds title to the property.31' Each spouse retains ownership
over his or her separate property after marriage, and property acquired during
the marriage as a result of inheritance or gift is the separate property of the
recipient.31 2 Neither the husband nor the wife may sell or transfer marital
property without the consent of the other spouse.313 The Compilation
prescribes an equal division of marital property when the marriage ends by
death or divorce.314
Indonesian Islamic court decisions are not generally published, and my
information on the work of the courts is based primarily on compilations of
selected court decisions published by the Supreme Court and the Department of
Religion. Judging by decisions in those compilations, the Islamic courts appear
to have fully embraced the marital property provisions of the Compilation of
Islamic Law--courts have rejected claims that property derived from the efforts
of one spouse alone is excluded from the marital estate.315 In one case, the
court invalidated a pre-nuptial agreement purporting to bar joint ownership of
property acquired during the marriage on the ground that the agreement was
contrary to Islamic law.316 While this decision benefited the husband because
the agreement sought to limit his rights,317 the decisions do not reflect a
systematic preference for men. A number of decisions have refused to give
effect to an agreement by the wife to relinquish her marital property rights in
return for her husband's agreement to divorce.318 As far as I have been able to
Abstraksi Hukum Islam [Information on the Content of the Compilation of Islamic Law:
Positivizing the Abstractions of Islamic Law], 5 MIMBAR HUKuM 21 (1992).
311. COMPILATION, supra note 3, art. 1 (f).
312. Id. arts. 86-87.
313. Id. art. 92.
314. Id. arts. 96-97.
315. E.g., Decision of the Islamic Court for Pekanbaru No. 153/1991 (Sept. 19, 1991),
reprinted in Yurisprudensi Badan Peradilan Agama [Islamic Court Jurisprudence] 248
(1995/1996).
316. Decision of the Islamic Court for Kotabumi No. 64/1986 (Aug. 7, 1986), reprinted in
10 MIMBAR HuKUM 62 (1993).
317. Id. at72.
318. E.g., Decision of the Islamic Court for Lhokseumawe No. 201/1990 (Sept. 27, 1990),
is reprinted in YURISPRUDENSI PERADILAN AGAMA DAN ANALISA [ISLAMIC COURT
JURISPRUDENCE AND ANALYSIS] 349 (1995).
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determine, all of the decisions since the promulgation of the Compilation have
ordered an equal division of marital property. In one case involving a
polygamous marriage, the property was divided in three equal parts-one-third
each for the husband and the two wives.319
IV. Conclusion
This Article has presented a broadly drawn historical sketch of the
reception of joint marital property into Indonesian and Californian law. This
cursory treatment of long and complicated historical processes does not permit
fine-tuned conclusions about the reasons why Indonesia and California
responded differently to the concept of joint marital property. It would be a
mistake, however, to seek to draw lessons about the essential character of
Islamic or common law from their treatment of marital property, unless it is the
lesson that such essentializing is misguided. Common assumptions about the
nature of Islamic law-that it is rigid, idealistic and largely incapable of
adapting to changing demands and circumstances-suggest that Islam would be
less rather than more receptive than the common law to the incorporation of a
system of marital property at odds with the law's basic conception of marriage.
An explanation for the different responses to the concept of marital
property in Indonesia and California focusing on the supposed imperatives of
legal ideology is clearly overly simplistic. That does not mean that prevailing
ideas about marriage and gender are irrelevant, however. The notable
difference between the Indonesian case and California is the source from which
those ideas were drawn. For most of American history, the state has played a
major role in shaping ideas about marriage and the family. Ideas about
marriage in Indonesia have been more closely linked to the perceived
conditions of daily existence.
It may also be significant that industrialization occurred later in Indonesia
than in the United States. The transformation to an industrial economy
involves a separation of the sources of household support from the home
itself.320 The spread of industrialization in North America may have impeded
receptivity to the principle of the economic value of household labor. When
wives were eventually afforded meaningful rights in wealth generated by the
319. Supreme Court No. 243 K/Ag/1996 (Jan. 8, 1998).
320. See Harriet Bradley, Changing Social Structures: Class and Gender, in MODERNITY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN SOCETIES 122, 122-48 (Stuart Hall et al. eds., 1996) (tracing the
evolution of class and gender divisions in the United States during the pre-industrial and
modem eras).
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household it was not generally based on the idea of marriage as a partnership in
which the success of the enterprise results from the contribution of both
spouses. Marital property in the United States appears to be based not so much
on a recognition of the economic value of household labor as it is on an
acknowledgment that women who do not enter the marketplace deserve to be
compensated for the cost of the lost opportunity. Industrialization occurred
later in Indonesia, and the partnership theory of marital property developed in
the context of a subsistence agricultural economy in which the household is the
basic unit of economic production.
Finally, mention should be made by way of postscript of on-going
controversy in both the United States and Indonesia over issues related to
gender, marriage, and family as well as over the question of the extent to which
intimate behavior should be the subject of public regulation. While the specific
subjects of the debates in the two countries differ, an important point of
similarity exists: Conservative religious movements that make gender issues
the centerpiece of their agenda have emerged in both Indonesia and the United
States. At the very least, these movements should serve as a reminder that
questions regarding marriage and the family will likely remain unsettled.
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